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THE CONSTITUTION AND CONTEMPT OF COURT* 
Ronald Goldfarbt 
l. INTRODUCTION 
T HE contempt power of American courts is as old as our judi-ciary itself and, while derived from historical common-law 
practices, is peculiar both to and within American law. It is pecu-
liar to American law in that other legal systems (not based on the 
English) have no such power of the nature or proportions of ours.1 
It is peculiar within our system in that no other of our legal powers 
is comparable to contempt in pervasiveness or indefiniteness. Nor 
does any analogy come to mind of a legal power with the inherent 
constitutional anomalies characteristic of contempt. The contempt 
power of American courts is truly "sui generis," to adopt a favorite 
cliche of our judiciary. 
Few legal devices find conflict within the lines of our Consti-
tution with the ubiquity of the contempt power. These conflicts 
involve issues concerning the governmental power structure su_ch 
as the separation of powers and the delicate balancing of federal-
state relations. In addition, there are civil rights issues attributable 
to the conflict between the use of the contempt power and such 
vital procedural protections as the right to trial by jury, freedom 
from self-incrimination, double jeopardy, and indictment-to 
name only the most recurrent and controversial examples. Aside 
from these problems, there are other civil liberties issues, such as 
those involving freedom of speech, association, and religion, aris-
ing out of the exercise of the contempt power. The purpose of 
this article is to present an extensive review of the constitutional 
problems provoked by the use of the contempt power by American 
courts.2 
Most of the constitutional issues concerning the courts' con-
tempt power arise from both its procedural authorization and prac-
tical implementation. A brief outline of contempt procedures 
should assist the review which follows. 
• The substance of this article is drawn from a book to be published by the author 
entitled THE CONTEMPT PowER. Other articles adapting sections of this book have ap-
peared in 24 MODERN L. REv. 239 (1961); 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 810 (1:961); 13 SYRAcusE L. 
R.Ev. 44 (1961); and 1961 WASH. U.L.Q. 1.-Ed. 
t Member of the California and New York Bars.-Ed. 
1 See generally Goldfarb, The History of the Contempt Power, 1961 WASH. U.L.Q. I. 
2 Analogous constitutional problems relating to the congressional and administrative 
contempt powers will not be discussed in detail in this article. 
[283] 
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While the congressional contempt power is presently governed 
by a single clear statute,8 the judicial contempt power is procedur-
ally more intricate, confused, and troublesome. The power of 
courts to punish contempts early became a settled precedent in 
English common law, though the extent of its application, his-
torically, is open to question. After a brief colonial use of con-
tempt powers, claimed to be inherent in the common law, and 
the formal establishment of the power by some state legislatures, 
the first federal statute concerning contempt of court was passed 
in 1789.4 This statute gave federal courts the discretionary power 
to punish contempts as defined by the common law, expressly 
covering misconduct of officers of the court, disobedience of proc-
ess, and misbehavior in the presence of the court.5 The contem-
nor was provided with no procedural rights and a judge was 
limited in sentencing only by his conscience. This enactment was 
followed in 1821 by a second federal statute6 authorizing a sum-
mary, virtually unrestricted power, albeit with certain specific 
limitations, encompassing the same categories of conduct as the 
prior legislation, except that the controversial words "or so near 
thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice" were added 
with reference to the offense of misbehavior in the presence of 
the court.7 A court's sentencing power is in many ways unlimited, 
and the procedures are often summary. Through the years some 
fear has been expressed about the unlimited nature of the power. 
Though few have advocated abolishing the contempt power itself, 
there have been some restrictions in its use by both limiting legis-
lation and judicial interpretation. 
The Clayton Act of 19148 included a provision guaranteeing 
/ the right to a jury trial in all criminal contempt cases arising out 
j of willful disobedience of any lawful writs or orders of the district 
courts. Further conditions required that the contemptuous act 
1 must be one listed as a federal or state criminal offense in order to 
/ fall within this provision, and that direct contempts and contempts 
arising out of suits brought by the United States be excluded from 
the statute's coverage. These qualifying conditions sobered hopes 
that the new law would be labor's Magna Carta by so circumscrib-
s 52 Stat. 942 (1948), 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1958). 
4 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 92. See generally Nelles & King, Con-
tempt by Publication in the United States, 28 CoLuM. L. REv. 401, 422 (1928). 
5 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 17, REv. STAT. §§ 725-26 (1875). 
6 18 u.s.c. § 401 (1958). 
7 The present statute reads much the same as the 1821 law. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1958). 
8 18 u.s.c. § 3691 (1958). 
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ing the scope of jury rights as to prevent the useful and available 
employment of the jury which it was hoped might be accomplished.9 
In the next decade, numerous bills were presented to Congress 
calling for liberalization of the harsh summary contempt proce-
dures, and finally in 1932 the Norris-LaGuardia Act was signed 
into law by President Hoover. This statute provided for trial by 
jury in indirect contempt cases arising out of labor disputes, and 
disqualification of judges personally involved in contempt actions.10 
When the Supreme Court ruled that legislation such as this did 
not violate the separation of powers doctrine, 11 several of the states 
followed with similar legislation ameliorating some of their more 
stringent contempt procedures. Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure further refined the accompanying procedures 
for prosecution of all direct and indirect criminal contempts in 
matters of notice and hearing. 
In 1957, the Civil Rights Act which was passed included certain I 
contempt provisions.12 This act, the first major federal attempt to 
deal with civil rights since post-Civil War times, gave injunctive 
protection to voting rights, enforceable through criminal contempt 
proceedings. Use of the contempt power was a pivotal issue in pas-
sage of the act, providing as it did an effective means for govern-
mental protection of rights already existing but lacking enforce-
ability. Contemptuous misconduct under this statute might arise 
out of disobedience to subpoenas issued by the Civil Rights Com-
mission13 or interference with voting rights.14 The statute grants 
contemnors the right to demand a jury trial de novo when their 
sentence exceeds 300 dollars or forty-five days' imprisonment. 
Otherwise the right to trial by jury is permissive and in the court's 
discretion. 
The courts have also shown some self-consciousness about the 
exercise of the summary contempt power, and at times have limited 
some of its harshnesses through judicial interpretation. Though 
less direct than legislation, this technique has often been as effec-
tive. For example, it has been noted that a strong policy against 
judicial control of the press provoked the Supreme Court to inter-
pret the "so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of jus-
9 See generally SWAYZEE, CONTEMPT OF COURT IN LABOR INJUNCTION CASES (1935). 
10 18 U.S.C. § 3692 (1958), formerly the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 
11 Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 67 (1924). 
12 71 Stat. 637 (1957), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971(e), 1995 (1958). 
13 71 Stat. 637 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 1975d(g) (1958). 
14 71 Stat. 637 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1958). 
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tice" clause of the federal contempt statute in a way which all but 
precludes most constructive contempt convictions.15 This attitude, 
the antithesis of the English treatment, results probably as much 
from distaste for summary procedures as from attitudes about the 
contempt power itself. Another example of judicial conservatism 
with the applicability of contempt procedures may well be evi-
denced by their interpretation of the federal statute's words "officer 
of the court" not to include attorneys.16 By such an interpretation 
contempt sanctions are given one less subject, though in other con-
texts attorneys are considered officers of the court. Further, courts 
have created mystic distinctions between civil and criminal, direct 
and indirect contempts,17 often to avoid or apply specific procedural 
protections attaching to those various kinds of contempts, if in dis-
regard of all other legal symmetry.18 Many of the tenuous judicial 
classifications of contempt appear to have been prompted, at least 
in part, by a desire to avoid the summary procedures typical of cer-
tain types of contempt. In other more isolated instances, courts 
have gone far to interpret statutes and situations in order to arrive 
at more just results, where the contempt power, strictly construed, 
might not have clearly directed such results. Thus one can note in 
the present body of contempt law a trend toward limiting in spe-
cific instances the harshness of certain procedures customarily used 
in trying contemnors. 
Beyond the statutory scheme within which the contempt power 
is now operative, the greater, more taxing and more vital issues 
15 See Craig v. Hecht, 263 U.S. 255, 280 (1923); Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 
247 U.S. 402, 418-19 (1918); Savin, 131 U.S. 267, 278 (1889); Froelich v. United States, 33 
F.2d 660, 662 (8th Cir. 1929). Cf. Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 50-52 (1941), overruling 
Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, supra. 
16 See Cam.mer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399, 405 (1956). But see Farese v. United 
States, 209 F.2d 312, 315 (1st Cir. 1954); Schmidt v. United States, 124 F.2d 177 (6th 
Cir. 1941). 
17 Contempt of court has been traditionally classified as either criminal or civil. 
Criminal contempt relates to conduct directed against the dignity and authority of the 
court, involving an act obstructing the administration of justice or which is disrespectful 
to the judiciary. Civil contempt, on the other hand, consists essentially in a failure to 
perform, or not perform, an act as ordered by a court in a civil action for the benefit 
of the opposing litigant. If, however, the contempt consists of doing a forbidden act, 
injurious to the opposing party, it may be considered as criminal. Whatever the initial 
classification, a contempt has usually been further categorized as either direct or indirect 
(or constructive). A direct contempt of court involves an act committed in the physical 
presence of the court while it is in session. An indirect (or constructive) contempt is 
one in which the contemptuous act is committed outside the court's presence. See, e.g., 
Nelles, The Summary Power To Punish for Contempt, 31 CoLUM. L. REv. 956, 960-61 
(1931). 
18 See generally Goldfarb, The Varieties of the Contempt Power, 13 SYRACUSE L. REv, 
44 (1961). 
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concerning limitations of the contempt power lie in the Constitu-
tion. As with so many important legal issues, it is necessary, in this 
case, to examine those parts of the Constitution which in a number 
of ways would appear to curb and qualify the contempt power. 
II. TRIAL BY JURY 
The most apparent abridgement of civil liberties resulting from 
current contempt practices is the denial of the right of an accused 
to have a trial by jury. Originally, few contempts in this country 
were tried by a jury. Gradually, American courts and legislatures, 
while relentlessly adhering to other vestigial common-law charac-
teristics of the contempt power, have discernibly, if sketchily, re-
treated from an absolute denial of the right to a jury trial. Now, 
all contempts of Congress are tried by a jury; so are indirect crim-
inal contempts of court if they arise out of certain labor disputes, 
if the act constitutes another state or federal crime, or if it arises 
under the Civil Rights Acts. But all direct criminal contempts, the 
remaining indirect criminal contempts, and all civil contempts 
continue to be punished summarily. 
A recent decision, Green v. United States,19 clearly underscored 
both the problems with respect to the right to trial by jury in crim-
inal contempt cases, and a political dilemma which arises out of 
the judicial dispositions of Supreme Court members, affecting the 
law in general, and contempt law more particularly. The case in-
volved two of the men who had been convicted in the celebrated 
New York Smith Act trial for conspiring to teach and advocate the 
violent overthrow of the government of the United States. They 
were sentenced to five-year imprisonments and 10,000 dollar fines. 
They were released on bail, but the court ordered them to appear 
on a set date for execution of their sentences. On that date it was 
discovered that they had absconded. They remained fugitives until 
their voluntary surrender four and one-half years later. At that 
time the United States brought criminal contempt charges against 
them for willful disobedience of the surrender order. This action 
was tried by the district court without a jury; they were found 
guilty and were sentenced to an additional term of three years'" 
imprisonment. The Supreme Court upheld this conviction and sen-
tence, finding no reasons of law, history, or policy which would 
mitigate the egregious offense of the defendants. 
No one would seriously suggest that the defendant's tardiness 
19 356 U.S. 165 (1958). 
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ought to have gone unsanctioned. The issue which the Green deci-
sion raised was the extent to which the constitutional safeguard of 
trial by jury is applicable to criminal contempts. Mr. Justice Har-
lan, who wrote the majority opinion, disposed of issues regarding 
the applicability and extent of the contempt power by resort to the 
accepted history and precedent surrounding the exercise of this 
power. Conflicting constitutional safeguards were dismissed as be-
ing inapplicable. An existing bail-jumping statute,20 under which 
defendants might have been tried, was deemed irrelevant. 
Mr. Justice Black, in a strong dissent, criticized the summary 
nature of the contempt power as "an anomaly in the law," ripe for 
"fundamental and searching reconsideration."21 He called for judi-
cial action which would reconcile the existence of a contempt 
power with what he conceived to be basic principles of the Amer-
ican form of government and our Constitution. His principal com-
plaint was that the manner in which the contempt power is admin-
istered denies the accused's traditional right to trial by jury, in 
his words, the "birthplace of free men."22 
This sharp divergence in attitude emphasizes the vital impor-
tance of the membership of the Supreme Court in the resolution 
of legal, political and even philosophical problems. Statement of 
such a conclusion unfortunately comes more easily than accurate 
and thorough description of the precise sources of the difference. 
As well as any single legal issue, the review of contempt practices 
crystallizes the existing differences in attitude within the recent 
Court. 
The majority disposition is best attributed to Mr. Justice 
Frankfurter's philosophy concerning the nature of judicial power. 
In 1924, while a member of the faculty at Harvard Law School, 
Professor Frankfurter and a colleague published an article which 
unearthed much of the academic misconception about the summary 
use of the contempt power.23 The clear import of the article was 
one of criticism. In fact, in his attack upon the historical support 
for the summariness of contempt procedures, Mr. Justice Black 
alluded to this article, and noted that the myth of immemorial 
usage as a justification for continuance of the practice had been 
exploded by recent scholarship.24 Yet, Mr. Justice Frankfurter con-
20 18 u.s.c. § 3146 (1958). 
21 356 U.S. at 193-94. 
22 Id. at 209. 
23 Frankfurter &: Landis, Power To Regulate Contempts, 37 HARv. L. REv. 1010 (1924). 
24 356 U.S. at 202-03. 
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curred in the majority opinion in the Green case, which upheld 
the contempt conviction, for reasons which he has typically urged. 
Change, he argued, must come, if at all, from the legislature. Courts 
are inhibited in this respect, notwithstanding their impressions con-
cerning the merits of the existing law. He stated that "the fact that 
scholarship has shown that historical assumptions regarding the 
procedure for punishment of contempt of court were ill-founded, 
hardly wipes out a century and a half of the legislative and judicial 
history of federal law based on such assumptions."25 Calling a roll 
of Supreme Court Justices and lower federal court judges who for 
150 years approved of the summary use of the criminal contempt 
power, and admonishing that the court is not a third branch of the 
legislature, Mr. Justice Frankfurter refused "to fashion a wholly 
novel constitutional doctrine ... in the teeth of an unbroken legis-
lative and judicial history."26 Citing former Mr. Chief Justice 
Hughes' words- "we do not write on a blank sheet"-and never 
mentioning the merits or demerits of the doctrine at issue, he cast 
the vote which made his views the substance of the majority deci-
sion. 
When Mr. Justice Black's attitude about those matters deemed 
crucial by Mr. Justice Frankfurter is compared, their differences 
become apparent. After stating his fear of the political dangers of 
the summary contempt power arising out of their conflict with the 
Bill of Rights, he urged that the precedents mentioned by Mr. 
Justice Frankfurter should be rejected because they were wrong. 
Though sound policy directs adherence to prior decisions, this 
practice should not be so inflexible as to preclude correction of 
obvious errors. Mr. Justice Black suggested that the prime respon-
sibility of the courts lies precisely in the exercise of this power to 
reappraise when valued parts of the Constitution are jeopardized.21 
Mr. Justice Black is usually characterized as the leader of that 
school of Supreme Court personnel loosely labelled as liberals or 
judicial activists. Speaking often in dissent, this group has been 
chiefly concerned with the substantial effect of any law upon the 
rights and liberties of individuals guaranteed by the Constitution 
in the Bill of Rights. The attitudinal conflict within the Court, 
which often reappears in the garb of legal rationales, has had an 
enormous impact upon contemporary American law and society 
25 Id. at 189. 
26 Id. at 193. 
21 Id. at 195-98. 
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in general, and often lies at the heart of the contempt decisions of 
American courts. 
There has been, in the past quarter of a century, an increasing 
inclination to alleviate some of the procedural harshness of stand-
ard contempt procedures. Extension of the right to trial by jury 
has been a foremost example of this trend. This trend is at least in 
part reflective of generally changing attitudes toward the value of 
the jury method of trial. As with more mundane fashions, the 
vogue toward the value of the jury system has had periods of rising 
and falling favor. Critics of the jury system in general have been 
as frequent and as vociferous as have been its advocates. Rather 
than digressing to enumerate the arguments, it should be only 
briefly noted that summary contempt procedures are most obnox-
ious to those who place faith and importance in the libertarian 
nature of trials by jury. 
It could well be suggested that, most peculiarly in contempt 
cases, the jury has a valuable role. First, it permits public partici-
pation in a dispute which is usually of an official, governmental 
character. Public enlightenment, even if only through jury repre-
sentation, has been characterized as an "indispensable element in 
the popular vindication of the criminal law."28 This hopefully en-
courages popular understanding and acceptance of the adminis-
tration of justice. Secondly, the jury may serve as an insulation 
between the alleged offender and the offended party (who is some-
times his judge and sentencer), allowing the jury, in an otherwise 
unlimited, uncontrolled situation, to function as a wall against 
possible abuses by governmental powerholders upon individuals. 
The general public may look with skepticism upon a judicial proc-
ess which allows one man to be victim, prosecutor, judge, and jury, 
while, as Mr. Justice Black has aptly observed, there is inclined to 
be less false martyrdom where a jury convicts. Thirdly, there are 
subtle subversive potentialities in summary criminal proceedings 
other than the direct issues concerning who should be the decision-
maker and why. The lack of external restraints over the vices of 
summary proceedings was also scored by Mr. Justice Black in his 
dissent to the Green decision. The detached review of a contempt 
decision by an appellate court whose members are sometimes sym-
pathetic to their brethren of the lower trial courts, and are often 
hesitant to reverse in absence of clear and serious error, is to some 
viewers an impotent or idle ceremony. Therefore, the original 
28 Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 23, at 1054. 
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denial of a jury trial is not only dangerous in itself, but this danger 
is compounded by being carried up through appellate levels in the 
form of an often "cold," unreviewable record.29 Judicial self-re-
straint, as that voiced by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the Green 
decision, induces lethargy in appellate judicial scrutiny. This has 
provoked Mr. Justice Black to comment that this offense, which is 
inordinately vague and sweeping in substantive scope, is now pun-
ished by the harshest procedures known to law and is subject only 
to token review.30 
For better or worse American law has adopted the practice of 
summarily trying contempt cases. How, then, can this practice be 
justified in light of our most basic legal directives-those found in 
the Constitution? With respect to the right to trial by jury, article 
III, section 2 of the Constitution provides: "The trial of all crimes, 
except in cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury .... " This par-
ticular section was included within the early substance of the Con-
stitution as a reflection of the strong feelings at the time of our 
nation's birth that the right to trial by jury was coequal with, and 
essential to, a government under law free from tyrannical abuse. 
The deprivation of this right was one of the serious grievances 
which the American settlers held against the King.31 Specific ex-
ceptions to this guarantee were included in the Constitution, so 
that it can be argued that the intent was not to exclude contempt 
from this coverage since it is not one of those exceptions. This argu-
ment is strengthened by the fact that contempt is not listed as a 
special judicial or legislative power in the enumeration of the 
granted powers of those governmental branches. Any other conclu-
sion respecting this aspect of the contempt power is interpretive, 
and based on less evidence. In the Green case, again, Mr. Justice 
Black noted that, although called upon to present any available 
evidence of intent on the part of the authors of the Constitution 
or expressed at the original state conventions, the government at-
torneys in that case could find no corroboration for the use of 
summary contempt proceedings.32 The cases during this period do 
not illuminate this uncertainty.33 
The Bill of Rights twice reaffirmed the importance to the peo-
ple of the right to trial by jury. The fifth amendment directs that 
29 See 356 U.S. at 200. 
so Id. at 199-200. 
31 See 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1778-1789, at 69 (Ford ed. 1904). 
32 356 U.S. at 206-07. 
33 See Comment, 57 MICH. L. REv. 258, 262 (1958). 
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"No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise in-
famous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand 
Jury .... " And the sixth amendment follows, declaring: "In all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury .... " The import of this 
latter constitutional provision was applied to the contempt situa-
tion in these compelling words: 
"The history which gave rise to the constitutional provisions 
guaranteeing the right of trial by jury 'is succinctly summa-
rized in the Declaration of Independence in which complaint 
was made that the Colonies were deprived "in many cases, of 
the benefits of Trial by Jury." ' 
"The Constitution provides, 'The Trial of all Crimes ... 
shall be by Jury ... .' But those fresh from experiences with 
tyranny were not content with this general guarantee, and 
Amendments VI and VII were promptly adopted, the former 
providing: 'In all [ criminal prosecutions], the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
jury ... .' The concept of a criminal 'prosecution' is broader 
than a 'trial' and the addition of the more inclusive term in-
dicates a determination to afford the right of trial by jury to 
those subjected to prosecution of any sort which might result 
in fine or imprisonment. The selection of the language of the 
Sixth Amendment is hardly explainable upon any other postu-
late."34 
Nonetheless, contemptuous conduct has been excluded from these 
constitutional protections and those who have disputed the clear 
meaning of these words have, for the most part, prevailed in their 
unique constitutional interpretations. 
The right to jury trial is initially dependent upon an ability 
to classify the contemptuous act as criminal.315 Writers, judges, and 
lawmakers have peremptorily brushed aside any argument about 
juries for civil contempts with declarations that such procedural 
provisions simply do not apply to the ordinary contempt situation.86 
Interestingly, even Mr. Justice Black has found no fault with sum-
mary procedures for civil contempts, although he has suggested 
that all criminal contempts be tried by a jury. In this former re-
spect, he is not in a minority. Since civil contempts most often arise 
out of equity proceedings, the seventh amendment's guarantee of 
34 Ballantyne v. United States, 237 F.2d 657, 667 (5th Cir. 1956). 
85 See Goldfarb, supra note 18. 
36 See, e.g., Fox, THE HISTORY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT 2-3 (1927); RAPALJE, A TREA-
TISE ON CONTEMPT § 10 (1890). 
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jury trials in civil matters would by its own terms-"In Suits At 
Common Law"-be inapplicable. So, civil contemnors are between 
two rules. One allows jury trial in civil matters arising out of other 
than equity actions. The other guarantees jury trial in criminal 
cases, a category from which civil contempts have been exempted, 
though many characteristics of criminal treatment attach in those 
cases. 
With these constitutional provisions in mind, as well as the 
judicial and legislative fiats concerning contemporary contempt 
practice, an analysis of the propriety of jury trial would seem ap-
propriate. Is contempt a crime? Is it an infamous crime? Are there 
any valid reasons for applying variant non-jury procedures in this 
situation? 
The fifth amendment speaks of "infamous crimes." Like the 
eighth amendment's prohibition of "cruel and unusual" punish-
ments, this phrase is subject to changing interpretations. In 1885 
the Supreme Court, drawing upon Lord Auckland's Principles of 
Penal Law, attempted to impart substance into the words "in-
famous crime."37 Ruling that no United States court had jurisdic-
tion over infamous crimes unless the fifth amendment's conditions 
precedent of indictment and grand jury were fulfilled, the Court 
set up two criteria of "infamy." The first entailed an inquiry into 
whether a conviction for that particular crime would result in i 
impeaching the credibility of the criminal in the future. This is 
based on an old rule of evidence which impugns the credibility of 
testimony given by one who has committed a crime involving moral 
turpitude or bearing on veracity. This test for infamy may become 
circuitous when one presses for definitions of moral turpitude. This 
legal term of art is often applied as an ingredient or characteristic 
of more infamous crimes, the type which would reasonably connote 
some questionable trait bearing on the probable truthfulness of 
the criminal. Reasonable as this rule may be, in the present context 
it leaves one with a formula stating that infamous crimes bear on 
credibility, and crimes bearing on credibility are infamous. It 
leaves indeterminant which crimes are by their nature infamous, 
or which aspects of criminal behavior bear either upon the infamy 
of the crime or the credibility of the criminal. 
The second criterion, which the Court adopted as a guide to 
determine the infamous nature of a crime, involved the mode of 
punishment authorized for the particular crime. Here again there 
37 Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 422 (1885). 
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is less insight afforded before the fact to establish the nature of a 
crime than reflection after the crime has been characterized or 
classified. Since in contempt cases, where no constitutional or statu-
tory maximums exist, the potential extent of the punishment is un-
limited, and therefore unknown until it is announced, one cannot 
determine at the time of indictment whether the crime is infamous 
or not. This phenomenon accounts for the inadequacy of the mode 
of punishment test in classifying criminal contempts as infamous. 
The Court has also mentioned that the nature of the crime, 
independent of its punishment, determined its characterization as 
infamous. Therefore precedent is only partly helpful in determin-
• ing whether contempt, or any crime, is infamous and warrants the 
protection of the fifth amendment. What was infamous early in 
English history may not have been so during the period of Amer-
ican colonialism, and in turn may or may not be so at the present 
time. Generally, the decisions have held that the possibility that 
grave punishment could be inflicted is the test for an infamous 
crime, and the test of grave punishment is the possibility of being 
sentenced to hard labor or imprisonment. This tautological logic 
consists of little more than holding that an infamous crime is in-
famous, and that infamous crimes are treated with punishments 
worthy of infamy. This is of little assistance in cases where there 
is question as to whether a crime has been committed, and what the 
sentence will ultimately be. 
Later decisions appear to have adopted the mode-of-punishment 
test.38 If a crime can be punished by a sentence including impris-
onment or hard labor, it is infamous. Again, a contemnor often 
does not know that he has committed what a court may later decide 
was a criminal contempt, or what his sentence will be even if he has 
some notion of his contemptibility. It is suggested that without 
employing further semantic niceties, it can be fairly concluded that 
contempt qualifies as an infamous crime by any reasonable stand-
ard which considers either the nature of the wrong or the usual 
gravity of the sentence. Contemporary America can concern herself 
with the procedural protection of her people who commit acts for 
which serious and unlimited prison sentences can be exacted, and 
which are as socially grave as rationales for the contempt power 
imply. The right to an indictment and a grand jury hearing has 
already been recognized in limited contempt situations by legisla-
38 See, e.g., United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433, 436-41 (1922); United States v. 
J. Lindsay Wells Co., 186 Fed. 248, 249-50 r.v .D. Tenn. 1910). 
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tion. Those areas which are not now embraced by this protection, 
other than civil contempts, should be. Society is apt to lose less by 
the minor delays and insignificant expenses of jury trials than it 
may from the insecurity which flows from arbitrary treatment of 
its citizens. Inexpensive, fast or easy convictions are the aim of 
neither the Constitution nor the Bill of Rights, and in fact are a 
trifling economy in view of the inequities likely to result from such 
unrestrained governmental tactics. This conclusion is strengthened 
by reference to the statutory definition of a felony as any offense 
punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one 
year.39 Contempt frequently qualifies under this criterion, as well 
as having all other characteristics commonly attributed to crimes. 
The other pertinent constitutional jury provisions allow even 
less latitude. That there shall be no trial without jury admits of 
little interpretation. But the courts have ignored this constitutional 
admonition, or disregarded it as inapplicable to contempt. 
The distinction between civil and criminal contempt has often 
entailed no more than a matter of retrospective classification of 
characteristics. The courts are as inconsistent in their conclusions 
as they are in deciding upon which characteristics to base their 
classification. So, while the Supreme Court was saying at one time: 
"These contempts are infractions of law visited with the 
punishment as such. If such acts are not criminal we are in 
error as to the most fundamental characteristic of crimes as 
that word has been understood in English speech. So truly 
are they crimes that it seems to be proved that in the early 
laws they were punished only by the usual procedure ... and 
that at least in England it seems that they may be and prefer-
able are tried in that way,"40 
at another time it was asserting with equal authority and vigor: 
"If it has ever been understood that proceedings according 
to the common law for contempt of court have been subject 
to the right of trial by jury we have been unable to find any 
instance of it. It has always been one of the attributes-one 
of the powers necessarily incident to a court of justice-that 
it should have this power of vindicating its dignity, or en-
forcing its orders, of protecting itself from insult, without 
the necessity of calling upon a jury to assist it in the exercise 
of this power."41 
so 18 U.S.C. § l(l) (1958). 
40 Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610·11 (1914). 
41 Eilenbecker v. District Court of Plymouth County, 134 U.S. 31, 36 (1890). 
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And a still more judicious, if not more perplexed Court, was saying 
about the dichotomatic difference between criminal and civil con-
tempts that "it may not always be easy to classify a particular act 
as belonging to either one of these two classes. It may partake of 
the characteristics of both."42 
The decision last quoted from held that contempt was sui 
generis, possessing the qualities of both civil and criminal wrongs.43 
Indeed it does. On the authority of precedent alone, that Court 
said that although contempt is criminal in nature, it is not criminal 
in the sense that the sixth amendment envisions.44 So concluding, 
it denied the right to a jury trial. This inconsistent, illogical judi-
cial treatment is not unusual in contempt cases. Courts are wont 
to justify their decisions on grounds that contempt is peculiar and 
subject to novel treatment. Therefore it may be considered a crime 
for the purposes of the statute of limitations and the pardon power, 
but not for the purpose of applying the venue guarantees of the 
sixth amendment.45 Such ad hoc treatment is all too typical. Courts 
have selectively held that contempt is what the Constitution meant 
by a crime in one clause, but not what it envisioned in another. 
All this is done with vision bordering on the clairvoyant, since the 
constitutional authors left no evidence of their intent in this re-
spect. 
Strong statements like those of Mr. Justice Black, if not pre-
vailing as judicial policy, have had some liberalizing effect on the 
courts. Mr. Justice Jackson has written that summary punishments 
must always and rightly should be regarded with disfavor.46 In 
another case, a court wrote: 
"It is abhorrent to Anglo-Saxon justice as applied in this 
country that a man, however lofty his station or venerated 
his vestments, should have the power of taking another man's 
liberty from him. 
"Society has always permitted one exception,-a limited 
right of courts to punish for contempts. But that right has 
been grudgingly granted, and has been held down uniformly 
to the 'least possible power adequate to the end proposed.' "47 
Mr. Justice Murphy expressed this hesitancy in these words: 
42 Bessette v. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 329 (1904). 
43 Id. at 336. 
44 Id. at 337-38. 
45 See United States v. Goldman, 277 U.S. 229, 235 (1928). 
46 Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 8 (1952). 
47 Ballantyne v. United States, 237 F.2d 657, 667 (5th Cir. 1956). 
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"The contempt power is an extraordinary remedy, an excep-
tion to our tradition of fair and complete hearings. Its use 
should be carefully restricted .... "48 
And more recently, a federal court reiterated: 
" ... the grant of summary contempt power ... is to be grudg-
ingly construed so that instances where there is no right to a 
jury trial will be narrowly restricted to the bedrock cases 
where concession of this drastic power to the courts is neces-
sary to enable them to preserve ... authority ... order ... 
decorum .... "49 
These three values-authority, order, and decorum-are cur-
rently tipping the scales away from constitutional protections ac-
corded criminal defendants, though not without the aid of some 
judges' thumbs. These are the overriding interests which courts 
consider to eclipse the established right to jury trial-these and 
the reverence of prevailing majorities of the Supreme Court for 
steady, respected precedent. 
This subject was treated long ago by Edward Livingston in his 
famous work on the penal system of New Orleans.50 In discussing 
the contempt power, he noted that all the rationales giving courts 
broad and indefinite contempt powers are based upon necessity.51 
This is so even though the power itself is repugnant to all the 
fundamental principles of criminal justice applicable to other 
criminal acts.112 He pointedly asked what sort of conduct would 
secure a man against a vain or vindictive judge.53 The necessity 
for promoting regard and respect for the judiciary which Black-
stone offered as a justification for the contempt power-the need 
for order and respect which courts now rely upon as authority for 
this power-can be gained only by impeccable judicial conduct, 
and not always by that. In response to the claims of necessity, he 
wrote: "Not one of the oppressive prerogatives of which the crown 
has been successfully stripped, in England, but was in its day de-
fended on the plea of necessity. Not one of the attempts to destroy 
them, but was deemed a hazardous innovation."54 
Mr. Justice Black emphasized this same point in his Green 
48 Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155, 167 (1949) (dissent). 
49 Farese v. United States, 209 F.2d !112, 315 (1st Cir. 1954). 
IIO 1 LIVINGSTON, COMPLETE WORKS ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 258-67 (1873). 
111 Id. at 258-59. 
112 Id. at 259. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Id. at 264. 
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dissent, pointing out that "necessary" has come to mean expedient 
rather than indispensable, and is applied too loosely to warrant 
derogation of fundamental constitutional rights. 55 Quoting with 
agreement the suggestion of Mr. Justice Holmes that, where there 
is no absolute need for immediate action, contempts should be 
dealt with like other breaches of law, 56 he added that there is ac-
tually more of a need in the contempt situation for delay to pre-
pare and prove a case than an urgency to try it immediately.57 
Livingston suggested that although courts may have a right of 
self-defense, only society as a whole has the right to punish offenses. 
Once the interruption to the court's proceeding ceases, the sover-
eign should be the only one to punish, and then only according 
to the procedures set out in the Constitution. It is not for the 
individual, or for the incorporeal body that is wronged, to punish. 
The sovereign which permits such retribution is radically defective 
because this gives a single party the right to punish. The necessity 
ends, he pointed out, with its own self-defense. The punishment 
should be by law alone. Though a governmental body has the 
power of self-defense, the power to punish should be exclusively 
vested in society as a whole, and not in its individual departments. 
He compared the practices in contempt cases with the right of 
individuals to defend themselves against assault. Certainly an in-
dividual may defend himself. But once having defended himself, 
he cannot punish his assailant other than through the orderly 
processes of law. Livingston concluded that contempt is less a 
necessity for the exercise of a legal power than an engine for its 
abuse; and though courts should have the right to dispel inter-
ference with the performance of their functions, that power should 
go no farther.58 
Still others have argued that the summariness of contempt pro-
ceedings is necessary because it speeds prosecutions, deters miscon-
duct, avoids delay in the judicial process, and promotes the dignity 
of the court. True as these observations may be, it is questionable 
whether in our democratic society these expediencies-and this is 
all that they are-are sufficient grounds to ignore important proce-
dural safeguards, such as the right to jury trial, which are so im-
bedded in the democratic way of life and our system of justice. 
And as long ago as 1874 the Supreme Court held that contempt 
55 356 U.S. at 213. 
56 Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402, 425-26 (1918) (dissent). 
57 356 U.S. at 216. 
58 I LMNGSTON, op. cit. supra note 50, at 266. 
' 
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of court is a specific criminal offense, and the fine therefor is a 
criminal judgment.119 Yet, arguments continued, opinions varied 
and exceptions were made, so that now there is no clear answer 
to gain from history. · 
The Constitution is specific and clear. Criminal contempt 
should be tried as other crimes are-with all procedural guaran-
tees protecting the accused. There should be the right to a jury 
trial of the charged contempt. The confusion wrought from vague 
and misleading distinctions between civil and criminal contempts, 
and the stronger policies of protecting individual liberty under-
score this logical conclusion. 
The argument that contempt is of a sui generis nature because 
it has customarily been treated peculiarly, and that it is treated 
this way because it is sui generis is of questionable appeal. Clearer 
views, such as Mr. Justice Black's comment in the Sacher case that 
"these contempt proceedings are 'criminal prosecutions' brought 
to avenge an alleged public wrong ... "60 are more directly rea-
soned, if not preferable in substance. 
There are instances where an act of contempt simultaneously 
constitutes another crime. There, by statute, the defendant is enti-
tled to a jury trial. Such laws were probably enacted to avoid the 
circumvention of the right to a jury trial by hasty or angry judges, 
who might treat an ambivalent act as a contempt instead of what-
ever other crime it was, in order to apply the stricter contempt 
procedures. How, it could be asked, can an act be a crime for so 
many purposes61-perjury, bribery, etc.-and sui generis for an-
other-contempt? · 
When a man is deprived of his property or liberty as punish-
ment for commission or omission of an act which is proscribed by 
society, for whatever reason, he is treated as a criminal. In con-
tempt cases there are no reasons strong enough to override the 
long and well-established policies guaranteeing the right to be 
tried by a jury, after indictment, and in the ordinary course of the 
law. The Constitution is quite clear in its directives in this respect. 
The policies involved go to support, at least in comparative value, 
the Constitution's implications. 
In the Green case, Mr. Justice Black in his dissent carefully 
articulated the argument for reinstatement of jury protections in 
criminal contempt cases. With a directness and clarity that should 
119 New Orleans v. Steamship Co., 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 387, 392 (1874). 
60 343 U.S. at 20. 
01 See, e.g., In Te Steiner, 195 Fed. 299, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1912). 
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be the standard of all who would follow this view in the future, 
he wrote: 
"The power of the judge to inflict punishment for criminal 
contempt by means of a summary proceeding stands as an 
anomaly in the law. In my judgment the time has come for a 
fundamental and searching reconsideration of the validity of 
this power which has aptly been characterized by a State 
Supreme Court as 'perhaps, nearest akin to despotic power 
of any power existing under our form of government.' Even 
though this extraordinary authority has slipped into the law as 
a very limited and insignificant thing, it has relentlessly swol-
len, at the hands of not unwilling judges, until it has become 
a drastic and pervasive mode of administering criminal justice 
usurping our regular constitutional methods of trying those 
charged with offenses against society. Therefore to me this 
case involves basic questions of the highest importance far 
transcending its particular facts. But the specific facts do pro-
vide a striking example of how the proce~ural safeguards 
erected by the Bill of Rights are now easily evaded by the 
ever-ready and boundless expedients of a judicial decree and 
a summary contempt proceeding. 
"I would reject those precedents which have held that the 
federal courts can punish an alleged violation outside the 
court room of their decrees by means of a sumro.ary trial, at 
least as long as they can punish by severe prison sentences or 
fines as they now can and do. I would hold that the defendants 
here were entitled to be tried by a jury after indictment by a 
grand jury and in full accordance with all the procedural safe-
guards required by the Constitution for 'all criminal prosecu-
tions.' I am convinced that the previous cases to the contrary 
are wrong-wholly wrong.''62 
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Some indirect ramifications of the exercise of the contempt 
power raise questions relating to provisions of the first amendment. 
All contempts are in the form of speech, writings, expressive acts or 
inaction. The first amendment reads: 
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances." 
02 356 U.S. at 193-94. 
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A. Problems Involving Freedom of Religion 
A freedom of religion issue arises only in a limited number of 
contempt situations. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 1793 
reported that in a case which was tried on a Saturday "the defend-
ant offered Jonas Phillips, a Jew, as a witness; but he refused to be 
sworn, because it was his Sabbath. The court, therefore, fined him 
10£.; but the defendant, afterwards, waiving the benefit of his 
testimony, he was discharged from the fine." 63 In a similar case, 
the Supreme Court, while recognizing an excuse from swearing 
for Quakers, denied it to a Jew, and found him in contempt for re-
fusing to be sworn.64 This type of problem is now somewhat obso-
lete since affirmation has been generally accepted as a substitute 
for the court oath. 
Another area of conflict, though not yet of serious proportions, 
has recently been before the courts. The Supreme Court of Iowa 
in 1956 dealt with the following situation.65 A Protestant woman 
and a Catholic man had married, and had had a child. They were 
later divorced, agreeing that the mother would have custody of 
the child and would rear him as a Roman Catholic. Years later the 
father sought to have the mother punished for contempt because 
she was rearing the child as a Protestant. The trial court held 
the mother in contempt, but suspended her sentence, giving her 
an opportunity to purge the contempt by rearing the child as a 
Catholic. This was a civil contempt proceeding to coerce her to 
act. She appealed to the state supreme court on the ground that 
this treatment violated her right to the free exercise of religion 
guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amendments. The court 
reversed the contempt conviction, but on the ground that the 
decree which she had disobeyed was too vague and uncertain to 
warrant a contempt citation for its breach, 66 thus avoiding the 
constitutional issue raised by the first amendment. 
There is some analogous, though indirect, precedent to support 
this first amendment defense. Rearing a child in a particular faith 
has been held to be the exercise of a religious act by the parent.67 
And the right of custody includes the right to dictate the religious 
teachings which one's child will receive. Parental agreements con-
os Stansbury v. Marks, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 213 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1793). 
64 United States v. Coolidge, 25 Fed. Cas. 622, 623 (No. 14858) (Mass. Cir. Ct. 1815). 
65 Lynch v. Uhlenhopp, 248 Iowa 68, 78 N.W.2d 491 (1956). 
66 Id, at 75, 78 N.W.2d at 496-97. 
67 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 
268 U.S. 510, 534.35 (1925). 
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cerning the religious education of a child are not so binding, in 
this context, that they cannot be altered by one of the parties free 
from legal censure.68 Those moral inhibitions of personal con-
science which may flow from such an agreement have not been 
considered to be within the control of the law. Such a judicial 
attitude involves a proper and natural application of the principle 
of governmental non-interference with first amendment rights by 
the courts-applicable to the states through the operation of the 
fourteenth amendment. 69 
Precedent such as this does not and ought not leave the of-
fended person without a remedy; the critical issue is with the 
nature of that remedy. Penal sanctions, such as those implicit in 
the civil contempt power, are not proper. The frustrated father 
may still seek the strictly civil, supervisory aid of the courts to 
protect his rights in ways less drastic than imprisonment of his 
spouse, or former spouse. Only the gravest social necessities should 
be deemed sufficient to warrant governmental curtailment of rights 
of religious activity.70 Even then it is questionable whether the 
contempt power is the most suitable vehicle of control. 
The issue which this problem raises could, under the present 
unpredictable status of the contempt power, fission into several 
tangential problems. The matrimonial, surrogate and juvenile 
courts are often called upon to deal with situations involving 
questions of religious freedom. Although there are numerous in-
stances in which these courts might feel compelled to exercise 
their contempt power, there is no clear-cut resolution of the prob-
lems raised by the first amendment's guarantee of religious liberty 
by the contempt cases to date. Better reason would suggest judicial 
abstinence in this area, at least insofar as the exercise of the con-
tempt power is concerned. 
B. Problems Involving Freedom of Speech and of the Press 
The free speech and press decisions in which the judicial con-
tempt power has been questioned might, by analogy, offer a solu-
tion to the religious liberty problem. In these cases, the courts have 
adopted a strictly construed "clear and present danger" test for 
68 See generally Friedman, The Parental Right To Control the Religious Education 
of a Child, 29 HA.Rv. L. REv. 485, 497-98 (1916); Note, 50 YALE L.J. 1286, 1292·93 (1941). 
69 See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925). 
70 See, e.g., Church of Jesus Christ v. Utah, 136 U.S. 1, 49 (1890); Reynolds v. United 
States, 98 U.S. 145, 163 (1878); State v. Massey, 229 N.C. 734, 51 S.E.2d 179, appi:al 
dismissed, 336 U.S. 942 (1949). 
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balancing the exercise of first amendment rights with other in-
terests which are often augmented by the sanction of the contempt 
power. 
This doctrine gradually evolved from the protracted contro-
versy within the Supreme Court concerning contempt by press 
publications in this country. Both the United States and England 
have long wrestled with the problem of maintaining a free press 
consonant with a system of fair trials.71 Often, the two goals have 
conflicted and, presently, both countries resolve the conflict by 
resorting, or not resorting, to the same contempt power.72 
In this country, the contempt by publication problem began 
as one of interpretation of the federal contempt statute. Courts 
were given the power to punish contempts in their presence "or 
so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice."73 This 
clause was first applied in its causal connotation.74 The application 
of the contempt sanction was left to the discretion of the judge, 
who could punish accordingly if a publication's commentary had 
a reasonable tendency to obstruct justice. This approach was aban-
doned in 1941, when the Supreme Court decided that the quoted 
words from the federal statute should be interpreted in a physical, 
rather than causal, context.75 Since most press publication occurs 
neither in the presence of the court nor "near thereto" geographi-
cally, the power to punish contemptuous publications was made 
ineffectual.76 Soon thereafter, the Court acknowledged the presence 
of the first amendment issues by adopting and applying Mr. Justice 
Holmes' clear-and-present-danger test77 to press comments about 
pending cases.78 This approach has been held applicable to the 
contempt powers of both the federal and state courts. Mr. Justice 
Black has referred to the clear-and-present-danger test as "a work-
ing principle that the substantive evil must be extremely serious 
and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances 
can be punished.''79 
The evils envisioned in the contempt by publication decisions 
71 See generally Goldfarb, Public Information, Criminal Trials and the Cause Celebre, 
86 N.Y.U.L. REv. 810 (1961). 
72 See generally Donnelly 8: Goldfarb, Contempt by Publication in the United States, 
24 MoDERN L. REv. 239 (1961). 
73 18 u.s.c. § 401 (1958). 
74 See Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402, 420 (1918). 
75 Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 48-49 (1941). 
76 See generally Donnelly 8: Goldfarb, supra note 72, at 241. 
77 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
78 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 262 (1941). 
79 Id. at 263. 
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are disrespect to the judiciary and interference with the administra-
tion of justice. Through the years the Supreme Court has not al-
lowed the exercise of the contempt power in the former instance. 
The rationale has been that judges should be above personal at-
tack, and that popular respect for the judiciary is less apt to be 
gained from exercise of the contempt power than from exemplary 
judicial conduct subject to open criticism. "The assumption," 
Mr. Justice Black noted, "that respect for the judiciary can be won 
by shielding judges from published criticism wrongly appraises 
the character of American public opinion."80 
Though recognizing the possibility of contempt treatment in 
the second category of presumed evils resulting from press com-
ments-interference with the administration of justice-courts 
have been chary to find the instance where the need to protect the 
fairness of trials overrode the value to be gained from permitting 
free discussion. The decisions· indicate that the courts have been 
more concerned with the conflict between the rights to fair trial 
and freedom of the press than with developing a consistent doctrine 
with respect to the power to punish contempts by publication on 
theories implicit in the contempt power itself.81 The Supreme 
Court's formula seems to grant the press a virtual immunity from 
contempt rather than resolve its historic struggle with the courts. 
Nevertheless, the actual scope of the immunity continues to be 
uncertain. 82 
Though the majority of the Supreme Court has limited con-
tempt as used against the press, a minority of the Court has 
consistently sought a broadening of the scope of the contempt 
power. However, the Court has recognized press abuse only under 
the due process clause, where press commentary has made a fair 
trial impossible.83 Moreover, the clear-and-present-danger test has 
been somewhat extended in decisions other than those involving 
the contempt power by emphasizing the magnitude of the danger 
of the evil as an aspect of its imminence.84 A change in personnel 
on the Court might tip the balance in favor of the minority which 
has been disposed toward extension of the contempt power in these 
cases in emulation of the English courts.85 
80 Id. at 270. 
81 See generally Donnelly &: Goldfarb, supra note 72; Goldfarb, supra note 71. 
82 See generally Donnelly &: Goldfarb, supra note 72, at 243. 
83 See Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951) (per curiam). 
84 See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951). 
85 See Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 920 (1950) (opinion of 
Frankfurter, J., respecting denial of petition for writ of certiorari). 
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Individuals, on the whole, have not fared as well as the institu-
tionalized press in avoiding contempt convictions for what might 
otherwise be characterized as an exercise of first amendment rights. 
In one decision the Supreme Court upheld the contempt convic-
tion of an attorney who disobeyed a trial court's admonition to be 
silent about a certain matter in his summation to the jury.86 Mr. 
Justice Black, for a four-man minority, wrote in his dissent to this 
decision: "Fisher having been stopped at one point tried another 
strategy. He was acting the role of a resourceful lawyer. The deci-
sion which penalizes him for that zeal sanctions censorship inside 
a courtroom where the ideals of freedom of speech should flour-
ish."87 
Another attorney was fined 1,000 dollars and imprisoned by a 
state court for six months for a contempt which had consisted of 
a series of critical letters and articles about the state judiciary.88 
A television announcer was found in contempt for comments made 
"over the air" concerning parties to a pending divorce proceeding 
in response to personal claims made against him in the divorce ac-
tion. 89 The trial court exercised its contempt power on the ground 
that the administration of justice had been impaired. A single 
letter to a judge was considered contemptuous,90 while an advertise-
ment by an insurance company concerning excessive verdicts and 
their economic effect was held not to present a clear and present 
danger to the administration of justice.91 A more recent case dealt 
with an avid segregationist who made a rousing speech to fifteen 
hundred people urging disobedience of federal court orders relat-
ing to the integration of Tennessee public schools.92 He spoke in 
violation of an injunction against interference with the court's 
integration order. The court upheld a contempt conviction, and 
ruled that the conduct of the contemnor was not protected by the 
first amendment. Since the right of free speech is not absolute, it 
can be subordinated to legitimate and overriding governmental 
objectives. He had created a clear and present danger of public 
disorder, and it was held that the first amendment did not give 
him the right to incite others to violence.93 
86 Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155, 162-63 (1949). 
87 Id. at 165-66. 
88 Stone v. State, 77 Wyo. 1, 53, 305 P .2d 777, 799, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1026 (1957). 
80 People v. Goss, IO Ill. 2d 533, 538-39, 141 N.E.2d 385, 388 (1957), reversing on 
other grounds the lower court's contempt order. See Note, 24 BROOKLYN L. REv. 123 (1957). 
90 Ex parte Ewell, 71 Cal. App. 744, 236 Pac. 205 (1925). 
01 Hendrix v. Consolidated Van Lines, Inc., 176 Kan. 101,110,269 P.2d 435,442 (1954). 
02 Kasper v. Brittain, 245 F.2d 92 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 834 (1957). 
oa Id. at 95-96. 
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The cases in this area are too numerous to list comprehensively. 
Since most disobedience which would constitute a contempt is in-
volved in some act which might well come within the protection of 
the first amendment, the possibilities of conflict are myriadal. One 
can examine any contempt case, and the probabilities are high that 
it involves some form of speech when silence was appropriate, or 
silence when speech was demanded. 
This problem is most vexing with respect to the conduct of 
lawyers in the course of trials. At what point does the proper zeal 
of advocacy end and contumacy commence? Although, on the one 
hand, attorneys should be given the broadest margin to advocate 
their clients' causes effectively, on the other they are representatives 
of the court with a professional interest in the fair and respectful 
administration of justice. 
There is no satisfactory answer to this dilemma, and courts 
have treated these situations in an ad hoc fashion. Recently, the 
Supreme Court disposed of two such cases. In re McConnell94 
dealt with an attorney who violated a court order to discontinue 
an offer of proof which the attorney felt in good faith was required 
by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The court sum-
marily found him in contempt for obstructing the administration 
of justice. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, stating 
that a lawyer's arguments for his client do not amount to contempt 
of court unless they so exceed the line of duty as to constitute an 
obstruction of the performance of judicial duties. Surely this line 
of demarcation is so vague and subjective as to provide little if 
any reasonable and foreseeable standard or guide. The second 
case, In re Green,95 dealt with an attorney who advised a union 
client to test the validity of a state court injunction because only 
the NLRB had jurisdiction to issue the requested order. The 
court found the attorney in contempt without a hearing. The 
Supreme Court reversed this conviction on the ground that it 
violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, and 
did not reach the first amendment issue. 
The status of the individual who claims that the first amend-
ment shields him from the contempt power of the courts is less 
certain than is that of the identical person who writes the same 
comments in a newspaper or magazine. In such situations the 
clear-and-present-danger test will usually be applied, but with less 
94 370 U.S. 230 (1962). 
95 369 U.S. 689 (1962). 
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certain expectation of sympathetic judicial reaction. There are 
no clear policies, doctrines or trends. Analogy with the press cases 
would indicate a liberal predisposition since the dangers of in-
terference with proceedings by the press are greater than those 
which might be caused by individuals. The courts' leniency in 
the press cases has been consistent. The lower courts have taken 
a case-by-case approach in non-press cases, and no cause celebre 
or precedent-setting decision has reached the Supreme Court which 
might hint of an established attitude. Nevertheless, although the 
degree of interference with the administration of justice by an 
individual would, in most cases, be less than that of the ubiquitous 
press, the individual's greater susceptibility to contempt convic-
tion is indicated by a study of court decisions. Possibly this is 
explained by the fact that many cases of contempt by individuals 
arise out of personal incidents involving direct affrontery to the 
judiciary. There is a danger that these convictions may in fact 
be more the result of governmental power being exercised for 
personal or emotional reasons than a desire to foster the efficient 
administration of justice. It may, as well, be a manifestation of 
the long-inculcated American attitude favoring the judicial power 
and the necessity for contempt law. 
Acceptance of what is now a minority view-that first amend-
ment rights are absolute-would clearly resolve these issues. The 
wisdom as well as the popularity of such an attitude is open to 
question which it is not the purpose of this article to include 
or evaluate, except insofar as it affects the present subject. In the 
contempt context, it is not unreasonable to suggest a complete 
first amendment protection of the press. Since judges may be 
left to private actions for defamatory criticism by the press, and 
ought to be able to withstand non-defamatory criticism, the prin-
cipal reason for the contempt power is to protect the fairness of 
the trial itself. This can be accomplished in ways calculated to 
interfere less with vital constitutional rights such as freedom of 
the press. In non-press cases it could be argued that the contempt 
power should be changed in this respect too. 
Some distinction between press-published comment and other 
verbal activity might be developed, recognizing the right of press 
or individual editorializing or opinion-venturing, while outlaw-
ing speech which is really no more ,than verbal misconduct of a 
slanderous or clearly obstructive nature. This, too, provides only 
a vague standard. 
The thinking and words of Mr. Justice Brandeis, as expressed 
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in his famous concurrence in Whitney v. California,96 echo elo-
quently over this issue, as they have over others in the intervening 
years since they were uttered. Authority must be reconciled with 
freedom; order should not be exalted over liberty. "[O]rder can-
not be secured merely through fear of punishment for its infrac-
tion; ... it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagina-
tion; ... fear breeds repression; ... repression breeds hate; ... 
hate menaces stable government . . . [and] the path of safety lies 
in the opportunity to discuss freely .... "97 
IV. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
The fourth amendment provides that the people have the 
right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects from 
unreasonable searches and seizures, and that search warrants shall 
not issue except upon probable cause and with sufficient particu-
larity. Fourth amendment defenses have been raised indirectly 
and infrequently in contempt of court cases, although such as-
sertions in congressional contempt cases indicate the existence of 
some analogies. 
The moving spirit of this constitutional provision was the 
protection of individual privacy from governmental trespass,08 or 
as one court put it, to protect against autocratic and despotic 
action under the color of national authority.99 The amendment 
was adopted in response to an unhappy English and colonial ex-
perience with general warrants and writs of assistance,1°0 and was 
specifically aimed at protecting the interests of individual liberty 
from governmental overbearing.IOI In words peculiarly applicable 
to the contempt situation, though not so intended, one federal 
court interpreted the policy of this amendment to mean that ex-
pediency in law enforcement must yield to the necessity of ob-
serving individual freedom.102 
It is now settled that Congress and the courts may compel 
96 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
97 Id. at 375. 
98 Cf. Jones v. United States, 131 F.2d 539, 540 (10th Cir. 1942): State v. Frye, 58 
Ariz. 409, 418, 120 P .2d 793, 797 (1942). 
99 United States v. O'Dowd, 273 Fed. 600, 601 (N.D. Ohio 1921). 
100 See Nueslein v. District of Columbia, 115 F.2d 690, 692 (D.C. Cir. 1940): State 
v. Nelson, 231 Iowa 177, 181, 300 N.W. 685, 687 (1941). 
101 Cf. Grau v. United States, 287 U.S. 124, 128 (1932); United States v. Zager, 14 
F. Supp. 23, 26 (D. Md.), afj'd mem., 84 F.2d 1023 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 55S 
(1936). 
102 United States v. 1013 Crates of Empty Old Smuggler Whisky Bottles, 52 F.2d 49, 
50-51 (2d Cir. 1931). 
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unwilling witnesses to disclose facts essential to proper govern-
mental inquiry, and, to that end, may enforce the attendance of 
witnesses and the disclosure of evidence through their subpoena 
and contempt powers.103 In this, they are limited only by the 
general rules of procedure and the Constitution. Where an in-
dividual asserts his prerogative not to cooperate, these govern-
mental bodies may exercise their contempt powers to punish him, 
or to try to coerce his cooperation. A fourth amendment issue may 
arise where an individual claims that compulsion of his testimony 
or securance of his property amounts to a search or invasion of 
privacy which the Constitution prohibits. 
Critical to the issues raised by fourth amendment contempt 
of Congress cases is the question whether the amendment's pro-
tection encompasses only physical, trespass-like interferences or 
whether the scope of this provision is broad enough to cover in-
direct psychological interferences, such as those claimed in first 
amendment defenses to congressional contempt convictions. In 
this sense, the inquiry is directed beyond questions relevant to 
the procedural application of the contempt power, and is ad-
dressed more to the substantive effect of its use upon rights of 
privacy in general. ls the amendment aimed at physical searches 
and seizures o'nly or, it could be asked, is it broader, encompassing 
an intangible right of personal security-some privacy of person 
and property? 
In contempt of court cases where direct physical interference 
is involved, the applicability of fourth amendment defenses is 
clear, whether or not tenable under the circumstances. For ex-
ample, a contempt of court conviction by which judges and clerks 
concerned with a state election were punished for misbehavior in 
office was upheld by the Illinois courts over the objection that the 
trial court violated defendant's fourth amendment rights by open-
ing ballot boxes and examining tally sheets which were used as 
evidence against them.104 Here, the assertion of the fourth amend-
ment defense is obvious. The government physically took things 
which were used as evidence against a defendant. Though the 
court did not uphold the defense, its assertion was appropriate, 
and typical of search and seizure cases in general. 
The more indirect effects of the contempt power upon fourth 
amendment rights are more obscure, and the issues less clearly 
103 See In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 671 (1897). 
104 People v. Montesano, 293 Ill. App. 630, 12 N.E.2d 915 (1938). 
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defi.ned.105 A recent federal case, though it dealt with a congres-
sional contempt situation, is exemplary of the problem.106 There 
the defendant argued that the threat of the contempt power nul-
lified the voluntariness of his submission of incriminating evidence. 
Called before a Senate investigating committee, defendant was 
threatened and led to believe that he must testify and incriminate 
himself, or be convicted of contempt for his refusal. The defend-
ant surrendered a drawer full of papers and books and was there-
after convicted of violation of the lottery laws, the conviction being 
based at least in part upon the evidence he submitted. On appeal, 
the defendant claimed that he did not understand his alternatives, 
and therefore his presentation of the incriminating evidence was 
really involuntary, and thus was a violation of his fourth amend-
ment rights. On appeal, the court of appeals ruled that his "free-
dom of choice had been dissolved in a brooding omnipresence 
of compulsion. The Committee threatened prosecution for con-
tempt if he refused to answer, for perjury if he lied, and for 
gambling activities if he told the truth."107 The court went on 
to say: "Courts and committees rightly require answers to ques-
tions. But neither may exert this power to extort assent to in-
vasions of homes and to· seizures of private papers. Assent so 
extorted is no substitute for lawful process."108 Concluding that 
the evidence was illegally seized in violation of the fourth amend-
ment, the court reversed the conviction. The dissenting judge 
believed that the situation was one of proper compulsion, a sound 
feature of the judicial process, and not an illegal coercion, and 
that this did not violate the fourth amendment.100 
The most profound issue raised-thus far unsuccessfully-
concerns judicial determination of the outermost reaches of the 
fourth amendment, and the extent of the amendment's protec-
tion of the right of privacy. Does the fourth amendment protect 
against infringements of a physical nature alone, or does it go 
farther to protect people against invasions of personal thoughts, 
associations, and property, and from public scrutiny and expo-
sure? The defense that use of the contempt power violates the 
right of privacy, guaranteed implicitly by the fourth amendment, 
has not thus far met with success. 
105 Cf. In re Estes, 87 F. Supp. 461, 462-63 (N.D. Tex. 1949), rev'd sub nom. Estes v. 
Potter, 183 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 920 (1951). 
100 Nelson v. United States, 208 F.2d 505 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 827 (1953). 
107 Id. at 512. 
10s Id. at 513. 
100 Id. at 520-21. 
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So far this issue has been dealt with by the courts only in 
the context of congressional contempt defenses. In these situations 
the courts have consistently held that forced disclosure through 
contempt of Congress convictions is not protected by any right of 
privacy which might be implicit in the policy of the fourth amend-
ment. 110 Investigations prompted by national needs can then con-
stitutionally invade an individual's right of privacy, at least insofar 
as the fourth amendment is concerned. The decisions to date have 
consistently held that, while the fourth amendment includes a 
right of personal security from physical attack and inspection and 
guarantees some element of personal sanctity and privacy, a proper 
legislative investigation is not preempted thereby.111 
The Federal Rules of Civil112 and Criminal113 Procedure pro-
vide for contempt proceedings in case of failure to obey subpoenas. 
It is conceivable that the thinking expressed in fourth amendment 
defenses raised in congressional contempt cases might prompt the 
assertion of a similar defense to a contempt of court conviction. 
The congressional contempt decisions portend similar disposition 
of possible contempt of court defenses alleging that forced disclo-
sure or surrender of evidence violates a right of privacy protected 
by the fourth amendment. 
In the recent flood of congressional contempt cases, where all 
constitutional defenses have been raised in defense to committee 
exposure tactics, the lower federal courts have consistently followed 
this approach.114 The mere fact that an individual's private affairs 
are subjected to the public gaze has not been considered sufficiently 
serious to bar an otherwise proper legislative inquiry.115 Still 
there has been no clear-cut decision by the Supreme Court dealing 
specifically and solely with the fourth amendment defense to a 
contempt conviction arising out of a congressional investigation. 
This defense is often made along with the gamut of other consti-
tutional defenses which have been typically raised in these cases. 
The federal courts have usually either denied the defenses in toto, 
or upheld the defense on narrow procedural grounds or on the 
basis of limited interpretations of a specific amendment other than 
110 Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929). 
111 Id. at 294. 
112 FED. RULE CIV. P. 45(£). 
113 FED. RULE CRIM. P. 17(g). 
114 See, e.g., United States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 
333 U.S. 838 (1948). 
115 See generally Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of 
Investigation, 40 HARv. L. R.Ev. 153, 219 (1926). 
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the fourth. The applicability of the fourth amendment defense 
to congressional investigations is closely linked with arguments 
about the "exposure" function of legislatures, and the general 
rights of individuals to resist inquiry into personal matters, ex-
posure of which would subject them to unofficial public condem-
nation. To this extent the defense has been thrown into what 
at times has been a hodge-podge of constitutional arguments, all 
amounting to the position that "you can't do this to me" or 
"there must be some constitutional provision to protect me." This 
has caused some uncertainty as to the scope of the fourth amend-
ment's provisions. Though the argument, in general, against 
legislative infringement of conscience or intellectual privacy is 
compelling, the legal rationale is less clearly attached to fourth 
amendment principles than relevant to first amendment protec-
tions of privacy. Rights of privacy implicit in the fourth amend-
ment differ from those guarded by the first. In the former, the 
invaded privacy is one deriving from a trespass of subtle though 
physical means, such as secretly wiretapping or televising speech 
or conduct. However, that right of privacy which properly protects 
persons from public ventilation of their spiritual or intellectual 
ideas is more suitably derived from first amendment freedoms of 
speech and association. To this extent, it would seem that right of 
privacy defenses in these fourth amendment cases have been ill-
advised. 
V. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 
The fifth amendment provides: 
"No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or other 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of 
a Grand Jury . . . nor shall any person be subject for the 
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; 
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law .... " 
A. Indictment by Grand Jury 
The first clause of the fifth amendment, requiring a present-
ment or indictment by a grand jury prior to trial for criminal 
offenses, has been mentioned briefly in connection with the dis-
cussion of the right to trial by jury. The guarantee has been long 
established; it is based upon the idea that one should not be put 
on trial until a body of his peers finds probable cause. 
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Mr. Justice Gray, while a member of the Supreme Court, 
elaborated on the purposes of the Constitution's grand jury re-
quirement,116 though not with specific reference to the contempt 
situation. He said that "whether a man shall be put upon his 
trial for crime without a presentment or indictment by a grand 
jury of his fellow citizens depends upon the consequences to him-
self if he shall be found guilty."117 By this standard, contempt 
would certainly qualify for grand jury protection, since the conse-
quences of contempt convictions could be, and often are, grave. 
Mr. Justice Gray went further, stating that no congressional decla-
ration could defeat this safeguard.118 Broadly considered, the pur-
pose of the clause was to limit the legislature as well as prosecuting 
officers. Of course, the grand jury provision of the fifth amend-
ment applies only to the federal government, and not to the 
states.119 However, most states have similar requirements in their 
own laws. 
The Constitution specifically excludes certain classes of cases 
from the protection of the grand jury provision.120 If contempt 
was meant to be excluded, it is conspicuously absent from any 
manifestation of historical intent-in the Constitution or else-
where. 
Surprisingly, although intermittent volleys of criticism have 
been fired at most other contempt procedures, the denial of the 
right to a grand jury hearing has provoked little attention or 
comment. This may be because the broad criticisms made of 
other contempt procedures implicitly include this argument. For 
example, if a right to trial by jury were allowed, indictments of 
some kind would probably follow a fortiori. If not, some of the 
dangers of its absence would be rectified by the jury trial itself. 
Sui generis rationales which are used in answer to other, often 
stronger, complaints about summary contempt procedures would 
undoubtedly be offered in response to arguments that the con-
temnor should be indicted by a grand jury. 
In contempt cases arising out of disobedience to orders of a 
court, it is not an unusual procedure for the action to be com-
menced by an order to show cause. Some courts have held that 
the particularity required of an indictment is not necessary for a 
116 Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417 (1885). 
111 Id. at 423. 
118 Id. at 426. 
1111 See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884). 
120 E.g., courts-martial. 
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contempt charge, and that technical accuracy is not required.121 
In one case of contempt, which arose out of the carelessness of a 
sheriff in permitting the escape of his prisoners, the contemnor 
argued that the charge was not sufficiently made out in the infor-
mation against him. The court, applying an exception to the 
general rule requiring particularity of indictments, denied the 
defense, and approved a fair notice standard for the indictment 
requirement.122 But even so, such cases allowing a casual treat-
ment of indictments impliedly conform procedurally to the con-
stitutional directive that there be some form of indictment or 
information. 
No case has specifically challenged the constitutionality of the 
practice, in direct contempt cases, of deeming the personal knowl-
edge and action of the offended judge sufficient satisfaction of the 
indictment-by-grand jury requirement. In certain cases of indirect 
contempt, and with a contempt of Congress, no problem is pre-
sented because the customary grand jury procedure is required 
by statute.123 But in cases of direct contempt, and in those cases 
of indirect contempt where the proceedings are commenced by 
the court sua sponte, by an order to show cause or similar pro-
cedural means, there may be a proper constitutional objection. 
Of course, civil contempts are excluded from many fifth amend-
ment protections because they are not crimes. Civil contempts 
arise almost spontaneously, and are part of the original action 
out of which they developed. 
The contemnor may well be apprised of the proceedings 
against him, even where summary procedures are applied. Under 
the present Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure indirect crim-
inal contempts are prosecuted by an order to show cause or an 
arrest order, and notice and hearing are guaranteed.124 However, 
pleadings may be based on information and belief, and direct 
criminal contempts are prosecuted on a certified order of the 
judge. 
On the other hand, that policy of the fifth amendment's in-
dictment clause which aims at insulating the individual from his 
government by interposition of a popular group of his peers is 
ignored. This right was adopted from the common law and is a 
121 See, e.g., United States v. Seidman, 154 F.2d 228, 230 (7th Cir. 1946); Conley v. 
United States, 59 F.2d 929, 935 (8th Cir. 1932). 
122 Fanning v. United States, 72 F.2d 929, 930-31 (4th Cir. 1934). 
123 52 Stat. 942 (1948), 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1958). 
124 FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b). 
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mandatory rule in normal federal prosecutions, intended as a 
substantial safeguard against oppressive or arbitrary proceedings.125 
The contempt situation involves exactly the kind of summary 
punishing power which this provision should cure. It is one of 
the few situations where our government has been so brash as 
to act in violence of this constitutional provision. To allow this 
clear constitutional mandate to be circumvented on grounds of 
expediency is to condone the abrogation of an important man-
date of the Bill of Rights. There is no counterbalancing govern-
mental necessity warranting the circumvention of this constitu-
tional right, except that which would call for expeditious litigation. 
Hurried justice may be no justice at all. 
B. Double Jeopardy 
The policy of the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amend-
ment may conflict with the contempt power to cause any one 
of several difficult, somewhat mathematical problems. The dou-
ble jeopardy problem can arise in two situations-the crossfire 
and the reiterated contempt. 
The crossfire situation is presented where one act constitutes 
both contempt and another crime, either in the same or another 
jurisdiction. For example, in the case of attempted bribery of a 
witness, the briber could be found guilty of contempt and/ or sub-
ordination of perjury, or perjury if he was successful in his at-
tempt. One wrongful act could then be punished twice. This 
problem is compounded in a case where the act of contempt is 
not a crime in the jurisdiction where it is committed, but con-
stitutes a separate crime in another jurisdiction. From this possi-
bility of crossfire of prosecutions arise problems involving dual 
sovereignty, immunity and double jeopardy. 
The second situation is one of multiplied pressures, in which 
the contemnor is forced to reiterate his act of contempt after he 
has been punished for the first act; or where one contempt is 
multiplied by reiteration of the same or a similar situation as 
resulted in the first contempt, and the separate punishment of 
each repeated contempt is immediately sought. The first situation 
could occur where an individual refuses to testify before a court, 
is sentenced for contempt and, after serving his sentence, is re-
called before the same court, again asked the same question, and 
again sentenced for his second refusal. The other situation arises 
125 See Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. I, 9 (1959). 
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where a witness is asked a series of related questions, refuses to 
answer any, and is punished separately for each contemptuous 
refusal. In such cases a persistent inquisitor could punish a per-
sistent contemnor indefinitely. 
In considering the applicability of the double jeopardy clause 
to contempt practices, it should be noted that the constitutional 
provision is worded in terms of "offenses"-"nor shall any per-
son be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy .... " 
Though verbally gymnastic critics have sidestepped or passed over 
other constitutional protections in contempt cases, no one has gone 
so far as to suggest that the unique act of contempt is not an 
offense. In fact, "offense" is the word usually used to describe 
contempt. Overcoming that hurdle, one can proceed to the sub-
stance of the clause. 
C. The Crossfire of Prosecutions 
Mr. Justice Brandeis dealt with the crossfire situation in a 
case in which a convicted contemnor argued that his conviction 
for contempt of Congress was improper because the same act of 
contumacy was made a crime by a special federal statute.126 The 
offense in that case could have been punished twice--once for 
contempt and again under the statute which made refusing to 
answer questions or produce papers before either house a misde-
meanor. Mr. Justice Brandeis dismissed the argument that the 
defendant was immune from one punishment because of the exist-
ence of another. He wrote, "Punishment, purely as such, through 
contempt proceedings, legislative or judicial, is not precluded 
because punishment may also be inflicted for the same act as a 
statutory offense."127 
An earlier Court, certain that this power would not be used 
cumulatively, had previously upheld a conviction under a federal 
statute which made refusal to testify before a Senate committee a 
statutory misdemeanor, even though the contemnor was subject 
to punishment for contempt of Congress as well.128 At that time 
Mr. Chief Justice Fuller wrote: 
"[I]t is quite clear that the contumacious witness is not sub-
ject to jeopardy twice for the same offense, since the same 
act may be an offense against one jurisdiction and also an 
offense against another; and indictable statutory offenses may 
126 Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125 (1935). 
121 Id. at 151. 
128 In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 672 (1897). 
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be punished as such, while the offenders may likewise be sub-
jected to punishment for the same acts as contempts, the two 
being diverso intuitu and capable of standing together."129 
The theoretical ground for this practice, which seems to circum-
vent precisely those results which the double jeopardy clause 
sought to prevent, is quite well settled. Where one act is both 
a contempt and substantive crime, it is an offense against judicial 
authority on the one hand, and against the state in general on 
the other. One punishment then is for an offense against the 
judiciary, and the other for violation of the law created by the 
legislature. 
Another judicial attitude, by which double jeopardy objec-
tions are avoided, was enunciated in United States v. United Mine 
W orkers130 in 1946. There the Supreme Court avoided charges 
of duplicity by classifying one contempt as criminal and another 
as civil.131 The rationale for this approach was stated, though not 
in a contempt case, in 1955.132 Congress may impose both a crim-
inal and civil sanction in respect to the same act or omission, 
since the double jeopardy clause prohibits merely punishing twice, 
or attempting a second time to punish criminally, for the same 
offense.133 So again, by its power to classify contempts, a court 
may avoid double jeopardy problems by characterizing one of the 
contempts as civil, though in effect treating it as an offense. 
The more difficult state-federal jurisdictional problem also 
arises in the context of contempt and double jeopardy. Early 
authorities held that one criminal conviction would not bar later 
prosecution for the same offense in another jurisdiction. Similarly, 
contempt actions are not precluded merely because the same act 
constitutes a crime such as perjury, bribery, or insubordination 
in a second jurisdiction. Here the individual is subject to double 
punishment for his one act. The misconduct is single; the offense 
to society is single; but the sanction is multiple.134 Recent statutes 
have, however, granted the right to a jury trial in some instances 
where one act is both a contempt and another crime.185 These 
statutes, while preventing a conviction-minded court from circum-
venting a jury trial by treating an otherwise ordinary crime as a 
1211 Ibid. 
130 !1!10 U.S. 258 (1947). • 
131 Id. at !100-01. 
182 Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, !150 U.S. 148 (1956). 
133 Id. at 150-51. 
134 See Bartkus v. Illinois, !159 U.S. 121 (1959). 
185 Civil Rights Act of 1960, 74 Stat. 90, 42 U.S.C. § 1971(£) (Supp. III, 1962). 
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contempt, do not satisfactorily alleviate the double jeopardy prob-
lem. One rationale for allowing double punishments in these cases 
is that the social interest which warrants legal protection is differ-
ent in contempt cases from that which might justify such action 
in the case of another crime. Even though the wrongful act is 
singular, the anti-social elements may be several. Contempt sanc-
tions are aimed at misconduct which interferes with govern-
mental activity. While kidnapping a witness, for example, is mis-
conduct toward the person of an individual, it may also involve 
an interference with government processes, and therefore consti-
tute a contempt. The ·wrongful act is the same, but the interests 
to be protected are different and, it is sometimes argued, warrant 
separate treatment. The usual explanation for allowing separate 
prosecutions in separate jurisdictions is, however, that the classic 
thought behind the double jeopardy clause was to prevent one 
sovereign from twice punishing the same act. It never was meant, 
so the argument goes, to preclude a second action by a second 
sovereign. So, one state may prosecute although the federal or 
another state government has already prosecuted. 
D. The Reiterated Contempt 
The second area of difficulty involves the so-called reiterated 
contempt. Assuming that all other elements were presented in a 
given contempt situation, could the punished contemnor be re-
punished if adamant in his disobedience to the same, though later, 
order? If the underlying justification for contempt convictions is 
the punishment of affronts to judicial authority, then a second 
contempt is a separate offense to that authority, although predi-
cated on exactly similar facts. However, if the reason for using 
the contempt power is to coerce cooperation or deter interference 
with government bodies, then a repeated incident comes closer 
to the double jeopardy prohibition. Although it might be argued 
that continuous punishments for interference would tend to in-
crease the coercive or deterrent force of the particular govern-
mental body, the second punishment borders on the overbearing 
power which the Constitution proscribes in the double jeopardy 
clause. 
The reiterated contempt situation directs attention, perhaps 
more clearly than any of the others involving contempt procedures, 
to the political and philosophical implications of this power. 
A court may want information. An individual may desire pri-
vacy, The conflict of the two desires may and often does cause 
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social friction of substantial political consequence. How far can 
and should government go in pressing its collective will against 
the uncooperative, free-willed individual? Even assuming that 
government can punish an individual's obstructiveness, should it 
be able to repunish for persistence of individual adamancy when 
that individual has already been once punished for that same 
characteristic? If so, when, if ever, is the government curtailed in 
its insistence? The issue is one of policy which should be reflected 
in the manner in which it is resolved by the law. 
By the preponderance of judicial authority, the power of a 
prosecutor initially to multiply contempts by reiterating similar 
questions has been limited. In Yates v. United States,136 the de-
fendant was charged with violation of the Smith Act. After waiv-
ing her privilege against self-incrimination, she refused to answer 
eleven questions put to her on cross-examination. The trial court 
treated each refusal as a separate contempt and sentenced her to 
one year in prison for each. Under such a system, the only thing 
insulating the defendant from a one hundred-year sentence is the 
limited stamina of the prosecutor. Fortunately, our system of 
justice is based on sounder principles. The Supreme Court held 
that her refusals constituted only one contempt. Refusal to an-
swer many questions within one area of refusal, it stated, consti-
tutes but a single offense.137 This concept has been applied in 
some state court decisions, but ignored in others.138 Although 
lower federal court decisions had similarly divided on this issue, 139 
presumably this decision of the Supreme Court has resolved the 
matter. Where separate questions seek to establish one fact, or 
relate to a single subject of inquiry, only one penalty for contempt 
may be imposed for refusal to answer all. 
The recent decision of Uphaus v. Wyman140 involved another 
facet of the same problem. Even though acknowledging that the 
government may not cause repeated contempt citations by reiterat-
ing its questions, may the frustrated government officer await the 
136 225 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1955), rev'd, 354 U.S. 298 (1957). 
137 Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66, 73 (1957). 
138 Compare People v. Amarante, 100 N.Y.S.2d 677, 682 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Fawick Air-
flex Co. v. United Elec. Workers, 92 N.E.2d 431, 436 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950), with In re 
Ward, 295 Mich. 742, 745, 295 N.W. 483, 485 (1940), and In re Amato, 204 Misc. 454, 
456, 124 N.Y.S.2d 726, 728 (Sup. Ct. 1953). 
139 Compare United States v. Orman, 207 F.2d 148, 160 (3d Cir. 1953), and United 
States v. Costello, 198 F.2d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 1952), and United States v. Yukio Abe, 95 
F. Supp. 991, 992 (D. Hawaii 1950), with Lawson v. United States, 176 F.2d 49, 53 (D.C. 
Cir. 1949). 
140 360 U.S. 72 (1959). 
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fulfillment of sentence for the first contempt by the contemnor, 
and then greet him with the same question, threatening another 
contempt conviction if he persists in his refusal? The cases have 
not answered this perplexing question. In the Wyman case, the 
defendant refused to answer certain questions before a one-man 
state investigating committee. He was committed to jail for one 
year. As the anniversary of his imprisonment approached, the 
contemnor and the contemned both indicated that they would 
repeat the incident. An onlooker could only hope that one would 
relent. Neither did, and as his final act in office, the attorney general 
moved for the unlimited confinement of the contemnor. Judge 
Grant, who ordered the first commitment, denied the motion, and 
Uphaus went free. Interestingly, the contempt of Uphaus was 
termed civil throughout all of the proceedings, and it arose out 
of a legislative investigation by an executive officer who, upon 
encountering the contemnor' s refusal, went to the court for an 
order, which resulted in a contempt of court conviction. 
Analogy with past rationales would probably have supported 
the second conviction. Good reason and mercy would not. Once 
having suffered the punishment for his strong and sincere convic-
tions, the individual ought not to be sacrificed again to overbearing 
officialdom. The Yates decision adds weight to this latter attitude. 
The double jeopardy problems indicated herein can be readily 
resolved either by liberal construction of the policy of the double 
jeopardy clause, or by the adoption of a statute covering the con-
tempt problem as a whole, thus treating contempt no better, and 
no worse, than other crimes. 
E. The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination 
in the Contempt Context 
The fifth amendment directs that no one shall be forced to 
testify against himself if his testimony would subject him to a 
criminal prosecution. Though this privilege relates solely to 
federal actions, all states have adopted it by their constitution, 
statutes, or judicial decisions.141 In the contempt context, prob-
lems may arise in one of two ways. First, an individual charged 
with commission of a contempt may refuse to testify on the issue 
of his contempt at the contempt proceeding. Secondly, one may 
refuse to testify about some criminal, non-contempt matter, and 
141 See Kroner, Self-Incrimination: The External Reach of the Privilege, 60 CoLuM. 
L. REV. 816 (1960). 
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this refusal itself may be considered a contempt.142 This would 
include situations where the refusal would subject him to criminal 
action either in the local or in another, foreign jurisdiction, and 
is akin to the crossfire situation discussed in the double jeopardy 
section. The first class of cases deals with the assertion of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination in contempt cases. The second 
category concerns the convertibility into a contempt of the invoca-
tion of the privilege against self-incrimination in a non-contempt 
case. 
The fifth amendment's proscriptions are phrased in terms of 
a "criminal case." Enough has been written about the important 
ramifications of a judicial classification of a given contempt as 
criminal or civil to warrant only its briefest mention again here. 
Better reasoning dictates agreement with Wigmore that the policy 
of the privilege against self-incrimination should apply to the con-
tempt situation.143 The possible legal consequences in the form 
of punishments of fine or imprisonment are reason enough to 
afford this constitutional protection. Wigmore concluded (and, it 
is suggested, correctly) that distinctions between civil and criminal 
contempts should not be the criteria for allowing the assertion 
of the privilege in cases of such basic importance. The applica-
bility of the privilege would better rest on its own policies and 
logic. 
Most states have held the state-established privilege applicable 
to contempt cases. One California court stated that "it is funda-
mental that requiring a defendant in a criminal case to testify 
violates his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination," 
and that "it is likewise a violation of this privilege to compel a 
defendant to testify in a contempt proceeding."144 The court re-
solved the classification problem in this manner: 
"Contempt of court is a specific criminal offense ... punished 
sometimes by indictment and sometimes in a summary pro-
ceeding .... In either mode ... the adjudication ... is 
a conviction .... [T]he proceeding to punish . . . is in the 
nature of a criminal prosecution. Its purpose is . . . to vin-
dicate the dignity and authority of the court. It is a special 
proceeding, criminal in character .... "145 
In Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co.,146 the Supreme Court 
142 See, e.g., United States v. DeLucia, 256 F.2d 493, 495 (7th Cir. 1958). 
143 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2257, at 341 (McNaughten rev. 1961). 
144. Killpatrick v. Superior Court, 153 Cal. App. 2d 146, 149, 314 P.2d 164, 166 (1957). 
145 Ibid. 
146 221 U.S. 418, 444 (1911). 
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ruled, in a federal criminal contempt case, that the alleged con-
temnor is entitled to the protection of the privilege, but it avoided 
approval or rejection of the applicability of privilege to civil 
contemnors. At least one writer has concluded that "a defendant 
in a contempt case, either civil or criminal, is entitled to claim 
the privilege against self-incrimination, and to require that the 
contempt be proven against him by other witnesses .... " 147 
In the category of cases where testimony would subject the 
individual to incrimination for another crime in the same juris-
diction, the courts have allowed claims of the constitutional pro-
tection with respect to defenses to charges of both contempt of 
court and Congress.148 
With the tremendous increase in legislative investigations and 
the adamant response of individuals in recent times to congres-
sional exposure tactics, the fifth amendment's self-incrimination 
clause has been invoked by many individuals as a shield from 
committee harassment. Since the contempt power was then sub-
ject to judicial review, the federal courts' interpretation of the 
fifth amendment was crucial to the resolution of this individual-
legislative committee conflict. Originally, these cases turned on 
procedural points such as whether the privilege was properly as-
serted, whether it was waived, what is incriminating, and whether 
the witness was apprised of his rights or the committee's purpose. 
The Supreme Court went far to extend the applicability of the 
fifth amendment in such cases, reflecting a policy sympathetic to 
the protection of individuals. Still, Professor Beck, in his study 
of the congressional contempt power, concluded that the vitality 
of the fifth amendment in congressional contempt cases was, as a 
practical matter, limited.149 Its broad application, he concluded, 
did not "presage any significant substantive limitations on the in-
vestigatory power," and its application carried "an aura of skepti-
cism toward the innocence of the persons who sought recourse to 
its protections."150 Perhaps this provoked the gradual turn to the 
first amendment as a surer protection from exposure and harass• 
ment, as suggested in the section on that subject. In any event, a 
review of some of the leading fifth amendment contempt cases is 
147 Menick, The Privilege of Self-Incrimination as to Charges of Contempt, 14 ILL, 
L. REv. 181, 187 (1919). (Emphasis added.) 
148 See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1951); Blau v. United States, 
340 U.S. 332, 334 (1951); United States v. Costello, 198 F.2d 200, 205 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 344 U.S. 874 (1952). 
149 BECK, CONTEMPT OF CONGRESS 89-90 (1959). 
150 Id. at 90. 
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appropriate in understanding the background of the more recent 
first amendment era. 
The general rules of immunity and waiver were held to apply 
to contempt cases as well as to any other offense.151 The rule 
allowing assertion of the privilege where the testimony sought 
would only indirectly tend to incriminate has also been applied 
in contempt cases.152 The same rule applies to contempt cases 
arising from the assertion of the privilege before grand juries. The 
breadth of the protection of the privilege in these cases has been 
liberally extended by the Supreme Court. Not only will the priv-
ilege against self-incrimination protect against answers that would 
in themselves support a conviction, but also to those which would 
furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the 
claimant for a crime.153 Any language reasonably indicating that 
the privilege is raised will be sufficient to invoke its protection,154 
and committees must clearly apprise individuals about the risk of 
possible prosecution for contempt if they do not cooperate,155 in 
order to be able later to secure a contempt conviction. 
Susceptibility to a non-contempt criminal prosecution in an-
other jurisdiction has not been accepted as a basis for protection 
under the privilege. Therefore, refusal to answer questions, on the 
ground that the answer would subject the 1-vitness to prosecution 
for a crime in another jurisdiction, would constitute a contempt. 
In 1892, the Supreme Court in broad language ruled that the 
self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment precluded forced 
incrimination in any criminal proceeding.156 "This provision," the 
Court said, "must have a broad construction in favor of the right 
which it was intended to secure."157 The Court held that the ob-
ject of the self-incrimination clause was to insure that a person 
could not be compelled to be a witness in any investigation where 
his testimony tended to show that he had committed a crime. Im-
munity legislation cannot circumvent this constitutional privilege 
151 See Regan v. New York, 349 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1955); United States v. Cohen, 101 
F. Supp. 906, 907-08 (N.D. Cal. 1952). 
152 See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1951). 
lo3 Greenberg v. United States, 343 U.S. 918 (1952) (per curiam), reversing 192 F.2d 
201 (3d Cir. 1951); Singleton v. United States, 343 U.S. 944 (per curiam), reversing 193 
F.2d 464 (3d Cir. 1952); Greenberg v. United States, 341 U.S. 944 (per curiam), vacating 
and remanding [in light of Hoffman v. United States] 187 F.2d 35 (3d Cir. 1951); Hoff-
man v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951); United States v. Coffey, 198 F.2d 438 
(3d Cir. 1952). 
154 See Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190, 195-98 (1955). 
155 See Bart v. United States, 349 U.S. 219, 223 (1955). 
lli6 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). 
lli7 Id. at 562. 
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unless it is so broad as to have the same extent in scope and effect 
as the privilege. The Court stated that "no statute which leaves 
the party ... subject to prosecution after he answers the criminat-
ting question put to him, can have the effect of supplanting the 
privilege conferred by the Constitution .... "158 The Court held 
that only a grant of absolute immunity would suffice to pre-empt 
this constitutional privilege.159 This decision could have been liter-
ally construed to mean that immunity must be absolute in order to 
do away with the self-incrimination privilege. However, the quoted 
language has been restrictively interpreted, by resort to its peculiar 
facts, to apply only within one sovereignty, and not to preclude 
later prosecution in a different jurisdiction. Decisions since that 
time have limited the immunity rule to apply only to prevent later 
prosecution in the granting jurisdiction. In one case160 a man was 
punished for contempt of a federal immigration inspector. He based 
his refusal to respond to questions on the grounds that his answers 
would expose him to federal and state prosecutions. The court of 
appeals remanded, and instructed the lower federal court to advise 
the witness which of his answers would incriminate him under 
federal law, and then to allow him to refuse to answer these, free 
from contempt sanctions. However, those answers which would 
subject him to possible prosecution under state laws were not 
covered by the privilege, and unless he purged his offense in this 
respect, he could be punished for contempt.m This holding is 
consistent with a long-noted and recently accented trend to reduce 
the circumferential protection of the privilege in deference to the 
independence of sister sovereigns in matters of criminal justice. 
This policy was thoroughly treated in a recent article, where the 
author properly concluded that such a restrictive policy cannot 
avoid "enervating the principle embodied in the privilege."1G2 
However, the policy is not without respectable and persistent 
authority. 
The problem of self-incrimination, immunity, and the con-
tempt power, as affected by the dual sovereignty concept, was 
recently before the Supreme Court.163 A prisoner was called before 
a federal grand jury and offered immunity with respect to ques-
tions which the federal government wanted him to answer. He 
158 Id. at 585. 
159 Id. at 586. 
160 Graham v. United States, 99 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1938). 
161 Id. at 750. 
162 Kromer, supra note 141, at 838. 
163 Reina v. United States, 364 U.S. 507 (1960). 
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refused, urging that his answers would subject him to state crimi-
nal prosecution. The district court found him in contempt of 
court, sentenced him to two years imprisonment, and included a 
sixty-day purge clause. 164 Both the district court and the court of 
appeals justified the contempt conviction on the ground that 
federal immunity need extend only to susceptibility to federal 
prosecution, and this it did in the case before it.165 The Supreme 
Court was faced with the contention that older precedent, 166 to 
the effect that the immunity extended only to the granting sov-
ereign, should be broadened to cover any later prosecution for 
the particular crime in question by any sovereign. The Court 
avoided the broad issue, and decided the case on the ground that 
the particular immunity statute under scrutiny should be inter-
preted as covering both state and federal prosecution.167 A dissent 
noted the admixture of civil and criminal aspects in the lower 
court's contempt citation and the absence of criminal procedural 
safeguards. 
In another case, which questioned a state court's contempt 
conviction based on the defendant's claim that state immunity did 
not protect him against later federal prosecution, the Supreme 
Court adhered to the concept of federalist division between state 
and national governments, and upheld the conviction.168 A dissent 
criticized the uncertain posture in which Supreme Court decisions 
had left the matter, noting that the current status of the self-in-
crimination clause was such that "a person can be whipsawed 
into incriminating himself under both state and federal law even 
though there is a privilege against self-incrimination in the Con-
stitution of each."169 A related problem involves the hazardous 
situation of a witness who is called before a state or federal agency, 
and ordered to testify. He can testify himself into the jail of an-
other sovereign, commit perjury, or remain silent and run the risk 
of imprisonment by the immediate sovereign for contempt. 
This view has been vigorously attacked, and has often pre-
vailed only by a one-man majority of the Supreme Court. The 
theory that the immediate and potential evils of compulsory self-
disclosure transcend any difficulties that the exercise of the privi-
lege may impose on society in the detection and prosecution of 
164 In re Reina, 170 F. Supp. 592, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). 
165 United States v. Reina, 273 F.2d 234, 235 (2d Cir. 1959) (per curiam). 
166 United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 148 (1931). 
167 Reina v. United States, 364 U.S. 507, 510 (1960). 
168 Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1958). 
169 Id. at 385. 
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crime seems more compelling than historical or academic argu-
ments about the original intent of this clause. 
This state-federal dichotomy is sometimes presented in situa-
tions where the work of one governmental agency• invades the 
province of another. Such a problem arose in a typical case involv-
ing a Senate investigation of organized crime. Senator Kefauver's 
committee questioned the defendant about his alleged violations 
of state laws. The defendant's refusal to cooperate was based on 
the fifth amendment's self-incrimination clause. He was adjudged 
in contempt. A federal district court ruled that the defendant was 
entitled to immunity against disclosures that might incriminate 
him under state or federal laws,170 and, in addition, that the fifth 
amendment precluded a federal contempt conviction where the 
federal investigation overlapped into matters of state concern.171 
The conclusion from these cases may be thus summarized. 
In a contempt case, the privilege may be raised as a defense to 
testifying where the testimony would subject the individual to 
a criminal contempt citation. It would seem that the privilege 
may be successfully raised in refusing to testify in order to avoid 
a civil contempt charge as well. An individual may also refuse 
to testify about matters which would subject him to a non-con-
tempt criminal prosecution in the same jurisdiction, and this re-
fusal will not be deemed a contempt. However, where testimony 
would subject him to non-contempt criminal prosecution in an-
other jurisdiction, his refusal on self-incrimination grounds will 
be held contemptuous. Yet, where one inquiry solicits testimony 
relating to incriminating incidents in two jurisdictions, defendant 
may refuse to testify about any of the incidents, or demand abso-
lute immunity from later prosecution in either jurisdiction. 
The essence of the self-incrimination clause is that forcing 
incriminatory evidence from an individual is unconscionable, 
generally resulting in unreliable testimony, and that he should 
therefore be constitutionally protected. This policy seems to be 
dissipated by that trend of cases which allows prosecutions in a 
second jurisdiction, based on evidence which would be unconsti-
tutional if admitted in the jurisdiction wherein it was secured. 
This kind of judicial reasoning allows individual rights to be sub-
jected to circuitous prosecution tactics. If the self-incrimination 
170 United States v. DiCarlo, 102 F. Supp. 597, 606 (N.D. Ohio 1952). 
171 Ibid. See Marcello v. United States, 196 F.2d 437, 443 (5th Cir. 1952); United 
States v. Licavoli, 102 F. Supp. 607, 609 (N.D. Ohio 1952); United States v. Aiuppa, 
102 F. Supp. 609, 612 (N.D. Ohio), rev'd, 201 F.2d 287 (6th Cir. 1952). 
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clause is to be given more than ceremonious effect, the rule in 
contempt cases should be brought in line with the rule which pre-
vails within each separate jurisdiction. Otherwise, inter-govern-
mental cooperation could emasculate the potency of this consti-
tutional protection. 
As with the double jeopardy situation, the self-incrimination 
problem is aggravated in contempt cases. The problem of cross-
fire of prosecutions, as arising in search and seizure, double jeop-
ardy and self-incrimination cases, is presently one of the most liti-
gated and argued about problems concerning constitutional law 
and political power. The interjection of the contempt power adds 
another pressure to an already explosive situation, by aiming 
punishment at the individual who, not knowing which way to 
turn, elects to stand still. 
F. Due Process of Law: Proof 
"Summary punishment of contempt is concededly an ex-
ception to the requirements of Due Process. Necessity dic-
tates the departure."172 
The due process clause is one which is doubly difficult to 
define. It is as uncertain semantically as it is as a direction of legal 
consequence. Its history has been one of redefinition according to 
the dictates of changing times and attitudes. Generally, if vaguely, 
it is a requirement for some minimum standard of comportment 
in governmental proceedings equivalent with contemporary con-
cepts of fairness and justness. The ~iscussion of the requirements 
of notice, hearing and representation, in the sixth amendment 
section to follow, establishes that many of the specific procedural 
guarantees in that amendment have been deemed applicable to 
the contempt situation, but under due process rationales. 
In Cooke v. United States,173 the Court wrote: "Due process 
of law, therefore, in the prosecution of contempt, except of that 
committed in open court, requires that the accused should be ad-
vised of the charges and have a reasonable opportunity to meet 
them .... [T]his includes the assistance of counsel . . . [ and] the 
right to call witnesses .... "174 Indeed, several of these rights are 
now incorporated in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,175 
172 Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 36 (1952) (dissent). 
173 267 U.S. 517 (1925). 
17' Id. at 537. 
175 FED. R. CRillr. P. 42(b). 
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should there be any uncertainty in constitutional interpretation 
with respect to the contempt situation. However, there are other 
aspects of contempt procedures which still raise serious due process 
questions. 
One of these problems is the requirement of a certain quantum 
of proof of a contempt. Civil wrongs are characteristically proved 
by "a preponderance of evidence," while crimes demand proof 
"beyond a reasonable doubt." However, the Supreme Court has 
again applied a variant formula to contempt cases, and, likening 
civil contempt to fraud, has called for a requirement of "clear and 
convincing evidence"-exceeding a mere preponderance,176 but 
something less than the "beyond a reasonable doubt" test of crim-
inal cases. In the case of criminal contempts, proof beyond area-
sonable doubt is required.177 These two criteria have occasionally 
been applied by federal courts, which have been astute about the 
rules but hopelessly confused about the proper classification of the 
contempt.178 Again, classification of a contempt is the key to an 
appropriate decision. 
In a recent case, McPhaul v. United States,170 the Supreme 
Court dealt with this problem. The Court was called upon to re-
view a conviction for contempt of a congressional committee. The 
defendant asserted that there was insufficient proof that subpoenaed 
records of the Civil Rights Congress (an organization alleged to be 
subversive) were relevant to the committee's inquiry, in existence 
or in his possession and control. The trial court refused to instruct 
the jury that they must find these three facts to be proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt. Instead, the court instructed the jury to ignore 
these facts because if the defendant had legitimate reasons for fail-
ing to produce the records he should have stated the reason for non-
compliance with the subpoena,180 thus giving the defendant the 
responsibility of coming forward with exculpatory evidence. On 
certiorari, the majority of the Supreme Court, following certain 
past decisions,181 upheld the contempt conviction. Relying on 
analogous precedent that records kept in a representative rather 
than a personal capacity are not subject to the personal privilege 
176 Oriel v. Russel, 278 U.S. 358, 362 (1929). 
177 See Nilva v. United States, 227 F.2d 74, 80 (8th Cir. 1955), afj'd in part and sen-
tence vacated, 352 U.S. 385 (1957). 
178 See Fox v. Capitol Co., 96 F.2d 684, 686 (3d Cir. 1938). 
110 364 U.S. 372 (1960). 
180 Id. at 379. 
181 United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 332-33 (1950); Bevan v. Krieger, 289 U.S. 
459, 465 (1933). 
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against self-incrimination,182 as well as the primacy of the House 
of Representatives' committee work, Mr. Justice Whittaker, for 
the majority, agreed that the defendant should have proved part 
of the Government's case against himself by cooperating in the 
gathering of evidence for his own future conviction. The Chief 
Justice and Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan dissented on the 
ground that the majority's decision "marks such a departure from 
the accepted procedure designed to protect accused people from 
public passion and overbearing officials."183 The presumption of 
innocence is shifted by giving such a defendant the burden of 
proof on the issue of the willfulness of his refusal. 
This point had been recognized in an earlier federal case.184 
Dealing with similar facts, the second circuit overruled a contempt 
conviction, pointing out that "the defendant can here legally be 
jailed only for a contempt in failing to produce the sought-after 
books when they are fairly shown to be presently within his power 
and control. He cannot legally be jailed for contempt for invoking 
his constitutionally protected privilege not to be a witness against 
himself."185 Admonishing that this case was a step backward, the 
minority in the McPhaul case warned: " ... when it comes to crimi-
nal prosecutions, the Government must tum square comers. If 
Congress desires to have the judiciary adjudge a man guilty for 
failure to produce documents, the prosecution should be required 
to prove that the man ... had the power to produce them."186 
The McPhaul case, though turning on what appears to be a 
narrow question of statutory interpretation, underscored a very 
basic concomitant of the exercise of the contempt power: the con-
stant tug between governmental power and individual freedom, a 
philosophical and political problem recurring again and again in 
the garb of legal decisions in contempt cases. Also, the case above 
deviates from the past federal court treatment of this problem. As 
far back as 1894 one federal judge wrote: "Accusations for con-
tempt must be supported by evidence sufficient to convince the 
mind of the trior, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the actual guilt 
of the accused, and every element of the offense .... "187 
Yet, where a direct criminal contempt is committed, the de-
fendant may be convicted upon the sworn statement of the judge 
182 See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 372 (1951). 
183 McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S. 372, 383 (1960) (dissent). 
184 United States v. Patterson, 219 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1955). 
185 Id. at 662. 
186 McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S. 372, 387 (1960) (dissent). 
187 United States v. Jose, 63 Fed. 951, 954 (C.C.N.D. Wash. 1894). 
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alone.188 That statement, it was held, "imports absolute verity."189 
The import and gravity of this procedure is compounded by the 
fact that the appellate courts have no record upon which to base 
any review and therefore usually uphold the trial court's discre-
tionary conduct. 
All congressional contempts are now prosecuted pursuant to 
a federal criminal statute,19O and as such require proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, as with all other crimes. The general civil-
criminal distinction is made concerning proof of contempts of 
court. However, these otherwise clear situations are muddied by 
interpretations such as that in the McPhaul case, and by odd clas-
sifications of contempts, as well as the special way of proving di-
rect and civil contempts. 
G. Due Process of Law: The Judge 
"A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of 
due process. Fairness of course requires an absence of actual 
bias ... :•191 
Another element of contempt procedures which would seem to 
conflict with the due process protection is that whereby the judge 
in a summary proceeding acts as judge, prosecutor, jury, and sen-
tencer. Often he was personally the subject of the contempt. This 
anomalous procedure derives from old English practices which 
were not, and still are not, looked at askance. We have seen that 
some of these practices have been proved to be based upon shaky 
historical foundations. Strictly a product of the common-law sys-
tem, this procedure is astonishing to those of the civil-law tradition. 
It is astonishing to some common-law lawyers, as well.192 Mr. Justice 
Black wrote in the Green case: 
"When the responsibilities of lawmaker, prosecutor, judge, 
jury and disciplinarian are thrust upon a judge he is obviously 
incapable of holding the scales of justice perfectly fair and true 
and reflecting impartially on the guilt or innocence of the ac-
cused. He truly becomes the judge of his own cause. The de-
fendant charged with criminal contempt is thus denied .. . 
an indispensable element of the due process of law .... "193 
188 See Bowles v. United States, 50 F.2d 848, 852 (4th Cir. 1931). 
189 Ibid. 
190 52 Stat. 942 (1948), 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1958). 
191 In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). 
102 See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 280 (1948) (concurring opinion). 
10a 356 U.S. at 199. 
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The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide: "If the con-
tempt charged involves disrespect to or criticism of a judge, that 
judge is disqualified from presiding at the trial or hearing except 
with the defendant's consent."194 A similar requirement was in-
cluded in the Clayton Act,195 but in some existing contempt situa-
tions the judge is still not disqualified. 
These provisions, though they apply only to indirect criminal 
contempts, are eminently proper as far as they go. Federal rule 42 
was based on the observations of Mr. Chief Justice Taft in Cooke 
v. United States.196 There he noted the delicate balance which in-
dividual judges must strike in these cases between any impulse 
toward reprisal, and such leniency as would injure the authority 
of the court. He suggested substitution of another judge wherever 
possible. Obviously concerned with this problem, Mr. Chief Jus-
tice Taft in an earlier opinion had suggested this inequity as an-
other ground for extending the pardon power to cover contempt 
convictions.197 
The Supreme Court has often noted the human qualities of 
judges by which they, as others, are subject to fallibilities and frail-
ties such as anger, petulance, and even vengeance. Whether judges 
are made of sterner stuff than other men, and are consequently 
better able to withstand the natural evocations of human emotion, 
has been debated many times and in many contexts.198 Although 
variant opinions abound, and the problem may never be ade-
quately resolved, it is not too heretical to suggest that a shift in 
personnel is more calculated to insure fairness in the trial of con-
tempt cases, and that the mere donning of judicial robes, and the 
consciousness of an oath taken long ago, may succumb to more im-
mediate emotional demands. In a case in which he discussed this 
issue, Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote: "These are subtle matters, 
for they concern the ingredients of what constitutes justice. There-
fore, justice must satisfy the appearance of justice."199 
Although one can never know the mental processes by which 
a judge has acted, it seems more reasonable to conclude that the 
impersonal authority of law is better guarded and applied by one 
who is not himself personally involved in a given conflict. Perhaps. 
104 Fro. R. CRillr. P. 42(b). 
105 18 U .s.c. § 3691 (1958). 
106 267 U.S. 517, 539 (1925). 
101 Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 122 (1925). 
108 See generally Goldfarb, Public Information, Criminal Trials, and the Cause 
Ct!lebre, 36 N.Y.U.L. REV. 810 (1961). 
100 Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954). 
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the most striking example of this problem involves the New York 
communist trials in 1949. There, Judge Medina and counsel for 
the defense wrangled and fought for nine months during a heated, 
protracted trial in a celebrated political atmosphere. At the con-
clusion of the trial, Judge Medina summarily sentenced his con-
temnors to six months imprisonment. The Supreme Court upheld 
the conviction,200 but Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote a dissent in 
which he deplored the trial judge's conduct.201 He included in his 
opinion an appendix of quotations from the trial record which in-
dicated the open hostility and distaste which the judge and con-
temnors had for one another. It would have taken godliness in that 
case for the judge to have acted impartially and with proper de-
tachment. Several of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's brethren felt that 
Judge Medina had shown somewhat less than that. 
Greater expansion on the demerits of judging a cause in which 
one is personally interested begs the very obvious. The axiom that 
no man should judge his own cause was one early accepted in 
American law,202 and with good reason. This was later applied so 
that a "direct, pecuniary interest"203 would preclude judicial ac-
tion. Professor Cahn recently noted the anomalous position which 
would have a wealthy judge disqualified on the basis of a minor 
or remote pecuniary interest in a cause before his court, while al-
lowing him to decide a case which involved matters of the deepest, 
most profound effect on his emotional attachments.204 Not only 
would his interest be likely to affect the issue of innocence or guilt 
of the contemnor, but it might also bear on the sentence exacted 
as punishment for the contempt.205 The due process inhibition on 
judges who are interested in proceedings applies to state officers 
as well, by application of the fourteenth amendment.206 
Still the Supreme Court has not gone as far as it could. It has 
not ruled that as a matter of due process of law a judge cannot sit 
in a case in which he is personally affected. It intimated so in Offutt 
v. United ·states,207 but that decision was based on the Court's 
supervisory authority over the administration of criminal justice in 
200 Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. l, 14 (1952). 
201 Id. at 30 (dissent). See also Madnnis v. United States, 191 F.2d 157, 161 (9th Cir. 
1951); Hallinan v. United States, 182 F.2d 880, 887-88 (9th Cir. 1950). 
202 See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 522 (1927). 
203 Id. at 535. See Groenvelt v. Burwell, 1 Salk. 396, 397, 91 Eng. Rep. 343, 344 (K.B. 
1699). See also Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605, 611 (1947). 
204 Address by Edmond Cahn, New York University Law School, November 1960. 
205 Cf. Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155, 167 (1949) (dissent). 
206 See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 139 (1955) (dissent). 
201 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954). 
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the federal courts-not on due process grounds. This leaves those 
judges who are so disposed to distinguish what could have estab-
lished a correct rule.208 
The Supreme Court has upheld a summary conviction for a 
direct contempt which arose out of an altercation between a trial 
judge and defense counsel in a case before that judge.209 Recogniz-
ing the difficulty appellate courts have in reviewing such cases, yet 
upholding the conviction, the majority of the Court agreed: "In 
a case of this type the transcript of the record cannot convey to us 
the complete picture of the courtroom scene. It does not depict 
such elements of misbehavior as expression, manner of speaking, 
bearing, and attitude .... "210 Mr. Justice Douglas felt that the 
majority opinion deprived the defendant of his constitutional right 
of freedom of speech; Justices Rutledge and Murphy dissented as 
well, but on due process grounds. 
Of all the complaints about the summariness of contempt pro-
cedures, the argument against having an insulted or at least in-
terested judge preside over the proceedings which adjudge and 
punish the misconduct requires the least support. Its moral and 
reasonable sense should not be open to legal distinction. Contempt 
is the only instance where such an anomalous practice occurs, 
though there is less reason there than in any other case. This in-
justice is already recognized in judicial decisions and by legisla-
tion. To the extent that this view does not presently prevail, relief 
should be afforded. 
VI. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 
The jury trial guarantee of the sixth amendment is not the only 
aspect of that constitutional provision which is pertinent to a re-
view of contempt practices. The full text of the sixth amendment 
reads: 
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State 
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, 
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, 
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; 
to be confronted by the witnesses against him; to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to 
have the assistance of counsel for his defense." 
208 Cf. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 139 (1955) (dissent). 
200 Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155, 160, 161 (1949). 
210 Id. at 161. 
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A. Venue 
In addition to the issue of whether contempt proceedings are 
criminal prosecutions and as such merit jury trials (which has al-
ready been discussed), the following section of the sixth amend-
ment, raising problems of venue, is also noteworthy. Before deter-
mining where the "crime" was committed the decision-maker is 
initially belabored with the recurrent problem of whether con-
tempt is a crime, as envisioned by that section. If it is not, of course, 
there is no sixth amendment venue issue. Assuming that it is, as 
good sense and reason would dictate, the venue problem may, in 
a given case, be one of constitutional magnitude. 
In 1924 the Supreme Court addresssed itself to the problem of 
ascertaining the proper venue for a contempt proceeding.211 The 
defendants had violated a court decree of one district court by 
contumacious conduct in another district. At the trial, an objection 
to the contempt jurisdiction of the first court was made on the 
ground of the sixth amendment's direction that crimes be tried in 
the district where they are committed. The Court held that con-
tempts are sui generis, not "criminal prosecutions" within the sixth 
amendment, and that the defendants' conviction was therefore 
proper.212 This authority has been followed213 on the theory that 
the court whose order was disobeyed would not have the power 
to punish the offense if a contempt had to be tried where the act 
was committed.214 Federal statutes provide that civil actions will 
be tried only in a judicial district where all defendants reside,215 
subject to certain qualifications not important to this discussion. 
The venue provision of the sixth amendment is now embodied in 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, as well.216 These are 
logical rules since in both civil and criminal contempts the wrong 
which is committed is directly or indirectly one to the court con-
trolling the main action. In cases of contempt by publication these 
rules could become awkward. Take, for example, the hypothetical 
case of a California newspaper which publishes a contemptuous 
article about a pending New York proceeding. The New York 
court, having plenary jurisdiction over the subject matter, must 
211 Myers v. United States, 264 U.S. 95 (1924). 
212 Id. at 103. 
213 See Sullivan v. United States, 4 F.2d 100, 100-01 (8th Cir. 1925); Mccourtney v. 
United States, 291 Fed. 497, 499 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 263 U.S. 714 (1923); Dunham v. 
United States, 289 Fed. 376, 378-79 (5th Cir. 1923). 
214 See Steers v. United States, 297 Fed. 116, 118. (8th Cir. 1924). 
215 28 U.S.C. § 139l(b) (1958). 
216 FED. R. CRIM. PROC. 18. 
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have the controlling power elsewhere as well. The contempt is to 
the New York court, although it might seem that the offensive act 
really took place in Califomia.217 This problem has arisen most 
often in cases involving injunctions, where court orders were vio-
lated in different districts from that of the court which issued the 
order. The decisions have uniformly upheld the power of the first 
court to deal with the contempt. It was stated in Dunham v. United 
States: 
"A proceeding for contempt springs out of a litigation insti-
tuted in a particular court. Its principal object is to secure 
obedience to the orders of that court, by punishing as a con-
tempt disobedience thereof. It is the court whose judgment 
or order has been defied which must try the contempt and 
pronounce judgment .... If the place of the trial for a crimi-
nal contempt must be in the district where the acts constitut-
ing it were committed, then where such acts were committed 
in a different district than that of the court whose order has 
been contemned, such court would be powerless to deal puni-
tively with the violation of its injunctive orders, and the trial 
and punishment of such contempt would have to be by a dif-
ferent court than that whose order had been defied. This 
would clearly be an alteration of the entire idea of a contempt, 
and in derogation of the power of a court to deal with viola-
tors of its orders."218 
The principal policy of the venue section of the sixth amend-
ment is to guarantee that a person charged with the commission of 
a crime will be tried by his neighbors who are familiar with the 
factual setting, rather than by strangers unappreciative of local 
problems, customs and values. This central idea is maintained in 
the contempt venue situation, though for slightly different reasons. 
Since a contempt conviction is designed to punish an act's ramifi-
cations (like judicial indignity or inconvenience) rather than the 
act itself (such as writing a letter to a judge, or failing to pro-
duce a book), it is sensible to conclude that the wrong took place 
where the particular ramification resulted, and not where the act 
which initiated that result was committed. A jury composed of 
residents of the area in which the affected court presided would be 
attuned to the problems presented by the case, and aware of the 
effect of the offense. 
217 Sec Sullivan v. United States, 4 F.2d 100, 101 (8th Cir. 1925); Binkley v. United 
States, 282 Fed. 244, 246 (8th Cir. 1922). 
21s 289 Fed. 376, 378 (5th Cir. 1923). 
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B. Speedy Trial 
The first section of the sixth amendment also speaks about the 
right to a "speedy trial." Is there some statute of limitations gov-
erning the contempt action? This problem was dealt with in 
Gompers v. United States,219 in which Mr. Justice Holmes wrote 
an opinion which discussed the time limitations for contempt ac-
tions. Gompers defended himself on the ground that a general 
statutory three-year time limitation for all non-capital offenses 
implicitly barred his conviction for contempt. Mr. Justice Holmes 
ruled that this statutory period was appropriate, and that formal 
or rigid legal formulas for statutory interpretation were to be 
avoided in such vital proceedings. Dismissing an attempt to avoid 
the application of the statute or the Constitution by classifying 
contempt as a sui generis "offense" not quite within the terms of 
either, he wrote: 
"[P]rovisions of the Constitution are not mathematical for-
mulas having their essence in their form; they are organic 
living institutions transplanted from English soil. Their sig-
nificance is vital not formal; it is to be gathered not simply 
by taking the words and a dictionary, but by considering their 
origin and the line of their growth. " 220 
"Indeed," he continued, "the punishment of these offenses pecu-
liarly needs to be speedy if it is to occur."221 He said by way of 
dictum that it was well that some rule be set out dealing with the 
punishment of this crime, by the courts if not by the legislature. 
"The power to punish for contempt must have some limit 
in time, and in defining that limit we should have regard to 
what has been the policy of the law from the foundation of 
the Government. By analogy if not by enactment the limit is 
three years."222 
Central to Holmes' thinking was his conviction that allowing an 
action to be commenced at any time "would be utterly repugnant 
to the genius of our laws.''223 
In a later contempt case, Mr. Justice Douglas applied the three-
year statute of limitations held applicable by Mr. Justice Holmes, 
and refined the holding by ruling that the statute began to run 
219 233 U.S. 604 (1914). 
220 Id. at 610. 
221 Id. at 612. 
222 Ibid. 
22s Id. at 613. 
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from the time of the contemptuous act, and not from the time of 
the last act by which the misbehavior was consummated.224 A five-
year period of limitations for the commencement of criminal con-
tempt actions is now guaranteed by a federal statute.225 A sister 
statute limits this time to one year in cases where the contemptuous 
act also constitutes another crime.226 
A civil contempt, by its very nature, becomes extinguished at 
the termination of the action from which it arose.227 One court has 
said that a district court which issues a compensation-oriented civil 
contempt order may, as part of that remedial process, later commit 
to prison where the order is not obeyed.228 However, acts violative 
of a decree, and thereby contemptuous, but occurring after the 
date of the final decree, can be punished as a contempt only so far 
as they violate terms of that final decree. Another court has gone 
farther and held that it is "within the power of the court to order 
punishment for such [civil] contempts whenever the proof was 
brought to its attention ... whenever it learns of acts which con-
stitute such contempts."229 This language seems unduly broad. Sup-
pose the court learned of the contemptuous conduct long after it 
was committed, and after the main action from which it arose was 
completed. A civil contempt citation would not only violate the 
policy against the revitalization of stale claims, but also would have 
no relation to the purpose of civil contempt--coercing a certain 
lawful result. In fact, this would seem to constitute a criminal con-
tempt sanction. 
C. Notice and Hearing 
The general trial procedures which govern contempt proceed-
ings are less than uniform, and depend again upon a prior classifica-
tion of the particular contemptuous act-here, as direct or indi-
rect.230 This distinction was drawn by the Supreme Court in 1888 
in a case which involved a determination of the proper procedures 
for a contempt committed in the presence of the court.231 The 
Court first stated the proposition that proceedings without notice 
224 Pendergast v. United States, 317 U.S. 412, 420-21 (1943). 
225 18 u.s.c. § 3282 (1958). 
226 18 u.s.c. § 3285 (1958). 
227 Cf. Parker v. United States, 126 F.2d 370, 379-80 (1st Cir. 1942). 
22s Id. at 380. 
229 Odell v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 91 F.2d 359, 361 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
302 U.S. 756 (1937). 
230 Cf. Savin, 131 U.S. 267, 276-78 (1889). 
2s1 Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 307 (1888). 
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and hearing are not judicial, or worthy of respect.232 It then ex-
pounded a special rule "of almost immemorial antiquity, and 
universally acknowledged"233-that notice and hearing are not 
required, and imprisonment may immediately follow-vital to 
personal liberty and ordered society, and applicable to direct con-
tempts. The Court adopted this rule, which it felt was based on 
precedent and necessity. 
"[I]t is a settled doctrine in the jurisprudence both of England 
and of this country, never supposed to be in conflict with the 
liberty of the citizen, that for direct contempts committed in 
the face of the court, ... the offender may, in its discretion, 
be instantly apprehended and immediately imprisoned, with-
out trial or issue, and without other proof .... [S]uch power, 
although arbitrary in nature and liable to abuse, is absolutely 
essential. . . . "234 
In a later case that same term,235 the Court articulated the rule 
for indirect contempts. Citing the earlier opinion and its rule for 
direct contempts, the court distinguished indirect contempts, hold-
ing that "whereas, in cases of misbehavior of which the judge 
cannot have such personal knowledge, and is [only] informed 
thereof ... the proper practice is ... to require the offender to 
appear and show cause why he should not be punished."236 At this 
proceeding, the court held, the accused should be given notice of 
the charges made, and an opportunity for explanation and de-
fense.237 The particular manner of the proceeding, though, is a 
matter for judicial regulation, so long as "it be without oppressive-
ness or unfaimess."238 Thirty-six years later, the Supreme Court 
ruled that these sixth amendment procedural rights were equally 
protected by the due process clause of the fifth amendment.239 
"Due process of law, therefore, in the prosecution of con-
tempt, except of that committed in open court, requires that 
the accused should be advised of the charges and have a rea-
sonable opportunity to meet them by way of defense or ex-
planation. We think this includes the assistance of counsel, 
232 Id. at 306. 
233 Id. at 307. 
234 Id. at 313. 
235 Savin, 131 U.S. 267 (1889). 
236 Id. at 277. 
237 Id. at 279. 
238 Ibid. 
239 Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925). 
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if requested, and the right to call witnesses to gwe testi-
mony .... "240 
And so the sixth amendment's rights of notice, hearing and 
counsel were held applicable to indirect contempts, though direct 
contempts were still permitted to be treated summarily, in order 
to avoid a feared demoralization of the court's authority. The bal-
ance again was judicially tipped in favor of judicial security and 
efficiency over personal liberty and procedural safeguards. 
The problem arose again in 1947.241 The Supreme Court was 
called upon to review a contempt conviction arising out of a secret 
one-man grand jury proceeding held pursuant to a Michigan stat-
ute. The court reversed the conviction on the grounds that the 
fourteenth amendment's due process protection included such pro-
cedural rights as public trial, hearing, notice of charges, examina-
tion of witnesses, and representation by counsel. Although the 
court was divided in its decision, the majority held that these pro-
cedural rights bound the states as well as the federal government, 
even in criminal contempt cases.242 
These rights are now covered by federal statute in most situa-
tions. For any contempt of Congress the accused is allowed all 
rights guaranteed by the sixth amendment. A similar situation also 
exists with respect to an indirect criminal contempt of court. For 
direct criminal contempt of court, or civil contempt of court, 
exceptions to the otherwise general rule are made. It is suggested 
that these exceptions are, as a matter of policy, unnecessary, and, as 
a matter of law, unconstitutional. The reasons advanced in support 
of these exceptional deprivations of procedural rights are prece-
dent, judicial self-defense and respect, and efficiency. Any legal 
proceeding, in which an individual may be imprisoned (whether 
for a specified and limited time, or more especially where the dura-
tion is unlimited), or deprived of his property in a penal sense, as 
is the case in all present contempt situations, should be treated as 
a criminal prosecution as contemplated by the sixth amendment. 
All rights warranted by that constitutional provision should be 
available to the accused contemnor. Any loss to society through 
judicial embarrassment, inconvenience, or delay would be far out-
weighed in social values by the added dignity of individual free-
dom and the greater respect which would derive from a system 
240 Id. at 537. 
241 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948). 
242 Id. at 273•76. 
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which consistently recognized these constitutional liberties. This 
is the liberal essence of our constitutional government, of our 
philosophy of the relation between men and law and government. 
VII. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
The eighth amendment provides that "excessive bail shall not 
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted." 
Mr. Justice Black's sweeping condemnation of contempt prac-
tices in the Green case also included an attack upon the open-end 
sentencing procedure available in many contempt situations. He 
wrote: 
"[A]s the law now stands there are no limits on the punish-
ment a judge can impose on a defendant whom he finds guilty 
of contempt except for whatever remote restrictions exist in 
the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and un-
usual punishments or in the nebulous requirements of 'reason-
ableness' now promulgated by the majority."243 
And later in that opinion he noted: 
"[I]ts subversive potential ... appears to be virtually unlim-
ited. All the while the sentences imposed on those found guilty 
of contempt have steadily mounted, until now they are even 
imprisoned for years."244 
This constitutional provision has been infrequently applied 
and strangely interpreted.245 The phrase "cruel and unusual pun-
ishment" first appeared in the English Bill of Rights in 1688. 
Thereafter, it appeared in early legal declarations in the United 
States, and finally was adopted as a part of the eighth amendment 
to the Constitution. All states have similar constitutional language. 
Courts, though infrequently visited with eighth amendment issues, 
have not always agreed upon its true meaning or application. Al-
though there is common agreement that the original purpose of 
this clause was to allay fears of excessive governmental intrusion 
upon personal liberties by providing a constitutional check, mod-
ern courts are less than clear about its interpretation, specifically 
regarding questions such as what is cruel, what is unusual, what 
constitutes punishment, and whether civil sentences are covered. 
243 356 U.S. 165, 200 (1957). 
244 Id. at 208. 
245 See generally Note, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 846 (1961). 
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The predominant view is that the clause is aimed only at pre-
venting barbaric, torturous punishments.246 Modem interpreta-
tions have occasionally gone farther, holding that it could be used 
to relieve sentences whose durations were cruel in proportion to 
the wrongful act, as well as in the mode or nature of the punish-
ment itself.247 
The eighth amendment promises little shelter to the contem-
nor who feels that his sentence is onerous. First of all, there is 
serious question about its applicability in civil contempt cases. The 
clause speaks of punishments, and the argument can be made that 
civil contempt sentences are remedial devices, not punitive sanc-
tions. In a legal sense, punishments are imposed for the com-
mission of crimes. In a literal sense, punishment is a penalty, 
retributive suffering, pain or loss. Civil contempt sentences are 
punishments in the latter sense, but not necessarily in the former. 
Occasionally the point has been litigated. In a New York case,248 
a husband was imprisoned for failing to pay alimony to his wife. 
He had suffered :financially from the Depression, and his wife was 
childless and earning her own living. After two years and seven 
months in jail, he applied for discharge from imprisonment. The 
court, facetiously nominating him "the senior inmate of the sher-
iff's alimony colony," released the contemnor, noting that the 
state's cruel and u,nusual punishment provision need not be limited 
to "barbarities," but should be construed as a "forward-looking 
and progressive declaration of principle."249 Critical of the rule 
which would confine the merciful application of the clause to 
criminal contempts while denying it in harsher civil contempt 
cases, the court wrote: 
"Under these sections if an intruder disturbs the serenity of 
a courtroom . . . the limits of judicial displeasure are cir-
cumscribed by statute. . . . However, let a waspish woman 
pluck the sleeve of the judicial gown ... and this temperate 
restraint is immediately cast aside, and the delinquent spouse 
faces the possibility of unending imprisonment. . . . This 
carries the supposed rights of women to absurd . . . lengths. 
[T]here are those who doubt the expediency of its extension 
into a form of petticoat justice."250 
246 Id. at 847. 
247 Ibid. 
248 Politano v. Politano, 146 Misc. 792, 262 N.Y. Supp. 802 (Sup. Ct. 1933). 
249 Id. at 793, 262 N.Y. Supp. at 804. 
21,0 Id. at 794, 262 N.Y. Supp. at 805. 
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The good sense of this reasoning has not prevailed. The cruel 
and unusual punishment provision has generally been held rele-
vant only to situations arising out of the more traditional criminal 
punishments, and civil contempts have consistently been differen-
tiated from this class of cases. 
The New York newspapers have reported, with proper indig-
nation, the confinement of an eighty-year-old woman for civil con-
tempt of a surrogate court. She had languished in prison for over 
three years before the same judge who committed her ordered her 
release. At the time of this writing she is still in contempt of that 
court, and conceivably could be sent back to prison. Her contempt 
resulted more from her naivete and ignorance of probate proceed-
ings than it involved any corruption of the administration of jus-
tice. The severity of the law of contempt upon little old ladies has 
been dramatically frustrating to the courts of England, too. In 
1886, a woman, unsuccessful in attempts to get legal title to some 
houses and property to which she claimed ownership, had to be 
enjoined from forcibly possessing them.251 When her endeavors 
were not deterred, she was incarcerated for contempt until she 
would conform to the court's order. She remained adamant, though 
in jail. Two years later, an embarrassed court discharged her from 
custody, lamenting their position and hopefully ordering her co-
operation. In its opinion, the court voiced regret that this annoy-
ing, though not serious, offense was punishable by imprisonment 
at all.252 
Mr. Justice Rutledge defined what he thought to be the man-
date of the eighth amendment, in his dissent to United Mine 
Workers v. United States.253 There, he wrote: 
"The law has fixed standards for each remedy, and they are 
... for damages in civil contempt the amount of injury proven 
and no more ... for coercion, what may be required to bring 
obedience and not more, whether by way of imprisonment or 
fine; for punishment, what is not cruel and unusual or, in the 
case of a fine, excessive within the Eighth Amendment's pro-
hibition. "254 
The realities have not always coincided with his articulation of 
policy. 
In civil contempt cases there is often no relation between the 
251 In re Maria Annie Davies, 21 Q.B.D. 236 (1888). 
252 Id. at 239. 
253 330 U.S. 258 (1947). 
254 Id. at 377. 
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sentence and the coercion necessary to compel obedience. In cases 
where the contemnor does not cooperate on grounds of moral in-
dignation or principle, or impossibility (as in some alimony cases), 
there is no calculable relation between the punishment and the 
goal sought. Unfortunately, this often results in harsh waiting-out 
periods, with the prisoner remaining in jail indefinitely. More-
over, civil contempts are in fact sometimes civil in name only, en-
tailing, in reality, criminal punishments.255 
There is equal question about the realism of the Rutledge for-
mula in criminal contempt cases. Most criminal contempt sentences 
are something short of cruel or unusual, though they may at times 
be viewed as harsh, more than necessary, or overly strict. 
In the Green case the convicted Smith Act defendants were 
given an additional sentence of three years' imprisonment for 
"jumping bail" in contempt of a federal court order to appear for 
sentencing. The maximum sentence under the bail-jumping statute 
was five years.256 But indictment under that statute would have 
guaranteed a jury trial before a disinterested judge. Such a severe 
sentence (and at that the judge was limited only by his conscience) 
is not unusual in contempt cases. 
Another Smith Act defendant was found guilty of criminal 
contempt and sentenced to imprisonment for four years.257 He 
failed to obey a district court order to surrender, and was appre-
hended two years later. The second circuit considered this sentence 
"well within a reasonable exercise of discretion by the trial judge, 
obviously ... not violating the eighth amendment .... "258 
In United States v. Toledo Newspaper Co.259 the publishers 
and editor of a local newspaper were fined 7,500 dollars for their 
constructive contempt of a pending judicial proceeding. Their 
offensive conduct consisted of no more than editorializing about 
a disputed street railway franchise in the city of Toledo. Far more 
vitriolic comments have gone unpunished since then because of 
the Supreme Court's reluctance to include press comments within 
the wording of the federal contempt statute. 
In the sensational United States v. United Mine Workers case,260 
255 Cf. Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959). 
256 18 u.s.c. § 3146 (1958). 
257 United States v. Thompson, 214 F.2d 545, 546 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 841 
(1954). 
258 Ibid. 
2159 220 Fed. 458, 515 (N.D. Ohio 1915), afj'd, 237 Fed. 986 (6th Cir. 1916), afj'd, 247 
U.S. 407 (1918). The case was expressly overruled in Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 
(1941). 
260 330 U.S. 258 (1947). 
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John L. Lewis, the famous union leader of the mine workers, was 
fined 10,000 dollars and his union was fined 3,500,000 dollars for 
contempt. Their contempt involved disobedience of a court order 
restraining interference by the mine workers with temporary gov-
ernmental operation of the mines during conciliation of a labor-
management dispute. The Supreme Court upheld Lewis' fine, but 
reduced the union's to 700,000 dollars, conditioned upon its sub-
sequent compliance with the same order. In a separate opinion, 
Justices Black and Douglas criticized the excessive sentence. They 
pointed out that the same interference during wartime would have 
been governed by a 5,000 dollar maximum fine under the War 
Labor Disputes Act. The equities in that case were compounded 
by the fact that the defendants believed, in good faith, that they 
were acting within their legal rights. Lawyers and legal scholars 
have differed in their interpretations of many laws similar to the 
one which gave rise to the contempt in the United Mine Workers 
case, and of the sweepingly broad language of the contempt statute 
itself. Even the Supreme Court has been unable to clarify this mud-
dled area of the law. 
Regardless of how onerous sentences for contempt may become, 
present indications point to little solace from the eighth amend-
ment's protections. This amendment was originally included in the 
Constitution to protect citizens against those horrid and barbarous 
punishments which the history of man had seen inflicted, and 
which shock the conscience of civilized society.261 However, Amer-
ican courts have restrictively construed this potentially merciful 
legal vehicle to the point where its utility is minimal. Capital 
punishment by gas, hanging, and electrocution have been con-
sidered neither cruel nor unusual. Prolonged imprisonments, and 
sometimes capital punishments have been imposed by less pro-
gressive states for relatively insignificant crimes. A three and a half 
million dollar fine for contempt was based upon a persistent but 
mistaken interpretation of the law. When John Kaspar, an extrem-
ist racist, flaunted a court order and attempted to provoke inter-
ference with the Supreme Court's segregation decision at Clinton 
High School in Tennessee, he was sentenced to one year's impris-
onment.262 The federal court which reviewed that contempt con-
viction disposed of the defense that the sentence violated the eighth 
amendment. Punishments are cruel and unusual, the court held, 
261 See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 437 (1890). 
262 Kasper v. Brittain, 245 F.2d 92, 96 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 834 (1957). 
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only where they are "so greatly disproportionate to the offense com-
mitted as to be completely arbitrary and shocking to the sense of 
justice."263 What criteria, or what sense of justice, the court did not 
indicate. Another federal court has held that the words "cruel and 
unusual" are to be considered in light of developing civilization, 
not what was so in the eighteenth century.264 But courts have given 
little attention to this constitutional problem, even philosophi-
cally. In a California case where policemen pumped a man's stom-
ach to retrieve evidence later to be used against him at trial, the 
Supreme Court could not muster approval.265 They reversed the 
conviction because these tactics were too close to the rack and screw 
for American justice to tolerate. In discussing the meaning of due 
process, the Court has spoken of those fundamental rights basic to 
fair play upon which our concepts of justice are founded. And in 
I 959, the Second Circuit, while recognizing that the unlimited con-
tempt power exists, remanded a case for redetermination because, 
among other things, a contempt sentence was so inordinately harsh 
as to be onerous.266 There, a defendant was fined 1,500 dollars and 
sentenced to imprisonment for six months. He had been summoned 
in California to appear before a New York grand jury. He sought a 
temporary adjournment but was refused. Though he failed to 
appear on the date required, he did appear voluntarily soon there-
after. He offered to purge his contempt and testify before the grand 
jury, but the government officials refused, and prosecuted the con-
tempt instead. However, such sporadic decisions have not coalesced 
to form a definite eighth amendment philosophy. 
On another occasion the Supreme Court offered a vague for-
mula for considering the cruel or unusual quality of punishments, 
which sought to strike some balance in the relation between the 
crime and the punishment.267 In discussing the cruel and unusual 
punishment provision, one state court judge wrote: 
"It is regarded as primarily relating to the kind and character 
or method of punishment, referring to inhumane or barbarous 
treatment or punishment unknown to the common law or 
which has become obsolete with the progress of humanitarian-
ism, rather than to the severity in the amount or duration. But 
263 Ibid. 
264 Ex parte Pickens, IOI F. Supp. 285, 288 (D. Alaska 1951). 
265 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). 
~6 United States v. Desimone, 267 F.2d 741, 747-48 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 
827 (1959). 
267 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 380-81 (1910). 
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it would seem that most of the courts hold it covers that 
too."2as 
The examples presented in this section would indicate either that 
the last sentence of this opinion is inaccurate, or that one indivi-
dual's concept of what is excessive in amount is at odds with that 
prevailing among many present authorities. 
In a recent contempt case,269 a federal court sustained a fifteen-
month sentence on the ground that it was reasonable when viewed 
in the light of other similar convictions of eighteen months,270 or 
three and four years,271 and the Supreme Court upheld the deci-
sion. The lower federal courts have "considerable latitude" in sen-
tencing for contempt.272 Compounded by the minimal trial record 
in contempt proceedings, and the reluctance of appellate courts 
to overturn the decisions of lower courts, this discretion is tan-
tamount to total license. In the case above, an aggressive district 
attorney asked the judge to mete out a substantial sentence, to 
omit a standard clause by which the contemnor might purge his 
offense, and to deny bail. The judge, in his discretion, did all 
three. 
In summary, for contempt of Congress there is a one-year maxi-
mum sentence; the eighth amendment would not prohibit this 
severity, but might possibly apply in cases where successive con-
victions were sought for the same but repeated act of contumacy. 
For certain specific contempts of federal courts, there are statutory 
limitations. Many situations find the courts with unlimited powers. 
Only three states have no statutory maximum on the quantum of 
punishment permitted incident to an exercise of the contempt 
power.273 Sixteen have a maximum for contempts committed out-
side of court, but none for direct contempts. Twenty-nine have 
overall maximums. Nine have maximums of six months; one has 
a three-month maximum; and the rest have thirty-day limita-
tions.274 
The cruel and unusual punishment provision of the Constitu-
268 Weber v. Commonwealth, 303 Ky. 56, 63, 196 S.W.2d 465, 469 (1946). 
269 United States v. Brown, 247 F.2d 332, 339 (2d Cir. 1957), aff'd, 359 U.S. 41 (1959). 
270 See Lopiparo v. United States, 216 F.2d 87, 92 (8th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 
U.S. 916 (1955). 
271 See United States v. Green, 241 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1957), afj'd, 356 U.S. 165 (1958); 
United States v. Thompson, 214 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 841 (1954); 
United States v. Hall, 198 F.2d 726 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 905 (1953). 
272 United States v. Brown, 247 F.2d 332, 339 (2d Cir. 1957), a!J'd, 359 U.S. 41 (1958). 
273 New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont. 
274 See Note, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 998, 1000 n.18 (1956). 
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tion, though indicative of a policy against excessive sentencing 
practices, in actuality operates only against barbarous, Draconian 
punishments. While contempt sentencing practices do not fall into 
this category, they may be viewed as more harsh, more extensive, 
and aimed less at purposeful, judicious goals than they might be. 
Some alleviation, at least, is deserved. The chances would appear 
to be better that this relief will be arrived at through avenues other 
than the eighth amendment. Courts may someday decide that cur-
rent contempt practices improperly result in cruel punishments, 
and the versatility of the Constitution, through the elastic powers 
of judicial review, will then be brought into play. 
Beyond this possibility, some trend can be sensed in recent years 
in which contempt sentences have been increasingly limited by 
statute. These legislative maximums have been realistic, and are 
the best answer to this problem-for two reasons. A statutory maxi-
mum sentence apprises the potential contemnor of the likely con-
sequences of his wrongful conduct before he acts. It would also 
limit the power of judges to exaggerate the gravity of punishments 
in cases where they might otherwise be so inclined. This is a far 
clearer method of controlling sentencing powers than the vague, 
varying, and often unusable protections of the eighth amendment, 
or the equally impractical recourse to judicial interpretations of 
excessiveness or unreasonableness. 
VIII. THE TENTH AMENDMENT: FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 
The tenth amendment to the Constitution reads: "The powers 
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor pro-
hibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or 
to the people." The powers of the federal government were early 
interpreted to include all those necessarily inferrable from specific 
constitutional grants as well as the powers which were expressly 
enumerated.275 These so-called implied powers have been the 
source of heated political and social conflicts from earliest times. 
One of the most volatile parts of the Constitution, touching sensi-
tive areas of local chauvinism and power, the tenth amendment 
has caused debate both concerning the respective content of state 
and federal powers, and relating to conflicts between those same 
powers. Which powers are to be left solely to the control of the 
states, and which to the national government? And how does one 
271'i See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
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determine which should prevail where both, properly asserted, 
conflict? Into this struggle the contempt power enters only indi-
rectly and infrequently. When it does, it provokes deep and diffi-
cult basic problems with respect to the balance of government 
powers. 
In re Comingore276 illustrates the basic problem. In that case 
a collector of internal revenue for the federal government was 
questioned as a witness in a state civil proceeding. He refused to 
provide certain information attempted to be elicited from him, on 
the ground that a regulation of the Treasury Department forbade 
such disclosure. He was fined and imprisoned for contempt, and 
brought habeas corpus proceedings. The federal district court held 
that the state had no authority over property or archives of the 
United States Government. The state imposition through the 
medium of a contempt proceeding was therefore improper. The 
court further held that though this might not be the case with 
respect to the federal government's access to public records of 
states, or vice versa, there was no corresponding right to demand 
information about non-public matters.277 If the latter pertained 
to internal governmental conduct which policy demanded be kept 
from the public, no right of inspection would exist. "The state has 
neither occasion nor right to call upon the United States nor her 
officers for reports made under the administration of its laws in 
order to enforce the collection of state revenue. Nor would the 
United States have the right to call upon the state."278 
Occasionally, the issue has recurred in the context of con-
gressional contempt cases.279 In United States v. Owlett280 the 
power of a state committee to investigate intrastate work of the 
Federal Works Progress Administration in that state was ques-
tioned. The United States objected on the ground that this in-
terference would obstruct proper governmental functions. The 
federal court enjoined the disputed investigation, holding that it 
was beyond the jurisdiction of the state, and an interference with 
the established immunity of federal agencies from state control.281 
Since this was not a proper area for state legislative action, an 
injunction against the state was issued. 
276 96 Fed. 552 (D. Ky. 1899), afj'd sub nom. Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459 (1900). 
277 Id. at 559. 
278 Id. at 561. See also Hopkins Savings Ass'n v. Cleary, 296 U.S. 315 (1935). 
279 See In re Wallace, 170 F. Supp. 63 (M.D. Ala. 1959). See also Comment, 70 YALE 
L.J. 812 (1961). 
280 15 F. Supp. 736 (M.D. Pa. 1936). 
281 Id. at 742. 
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The recent conflict between the New York-New Jersey Port 
Authority and the Geller House Judiciary Sub-Committee gave 
to the problem some added notoriety.282 An officer of the Port 
Authority, an interstate municipal agency created by a compact 
between the two states, was subpoenaed to produce a voluminous 
amount of the Authority's records before the House sub-commit-
tee. In obedience to orders of the governors of New York and 
New Jersey he refused, and Congress cited him for contempt. One 
of his defenses to the congressional contempt citation was that fed-
eral investigations into areas of state concern unconstitutionally 
interfere with the federal system of government as exemplified by 
the reservation clause of the tenth amendment. It had been sug-
gested that "the theory that state documents are sacrosanct when 
dealing with wholly internal matters was recently rejected.283 The 
district court found Tobin guilty of contempt. The court of ap-
peals reversed. The Port Authority case is now being appealed by 
the Government. The tenth amendment issue was left unanswered 
by the court of appeals decision. In the lower court opinion in 
this case, Judge Youngdahl did attempt to reach this constitutional 
issue. He wrote: 
"If possible, attempt should be made to accommodate con-
flicting powers which overlap before it is decided that one 
must yield absolutely to the other .... Honest and vigilant 
administration of the balancing test by the courts can ac-
complish this result. The Federal system is itself the product 
of accommodation between the need for central direction of 
affairs affecting the entire nation and the desire to prevent 
overcentralization .... "284 
As a final example, the contempt situation which arose from 
the recent dispute in Mississippi between the governor of that 
state and the federal courts and executive glaringly exemplifies 
the emotional content of tenth amendment conflicts. Such cases 
show both the versatility of the amendment, its adaptability to 
thwart any federal action with which a state may disagree, as well 
as the deep-felt and incendiary nature of the issue which the 
amendment raises.285 
2s2 United States v. Tobin, 195 F. Supp. 588 (D.D.C. 1961), aff d, .306 F.2d 270 (D.C. 
Cir.), cert. denied, .31 U.S.L. WEEK .3165 (U.S. Nov. 1.3, 1962). 
283 Comment, 70 YALE L.J. 812, 817 (1961). 
284 United States v. Tobin, 195 F. Supp. 588, 612 (D.D.C. 1961). 
285 It might have been an interesting paradox had Governor Barnett questioned the 
constitutionality of contempt of court practices, and taken his case to the Supreme Court, 
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The assertion of states' rights arguments to uphold civil lib-
erties is itself interesting. Lately, a states' rights approach has 
been frequently argued in defense of conservative causes, and in 
conflict with certain libertarian objectives. Yet, it may be that 
contempt convictions, arising out of federal interference with state 
governmental bodies or agents, violate the tenth amendment, and 
that the reverse might well be true unless some broader province 
is given to the powers of the national government in conflicts 
arising out of a federal system. The final decision should be doubly 
interesting, as most issues arising from use of the contempt power 
involve the rights of government versus individuals. Here, the 
case is one of two sovereigns disputing powers, and attempting to 
utilize the coercive contempt tool to prevail. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The matters which have been herein discussed indicate that the 
legal treatment of the judicial contempt power has created a con-
stitutional maze. Peculiar handling of a frequently-implemented 
power has resulted in a unique body of law. The purpose of this 
article was merely to point out some of the constitutional ramifi-
cations and anomalies incident to the utilization of this unusual 
legal device. Answers or attitudes about particular problems have 
been suggested or hinted at along the way. No complete analysis 
was intended. Even so, selective consideration of the major con-
stitutional problems suggests that some new and deep-cutting 
changes should be wrought. 
where the activists have as consistently criticized the denial of the right to trial by jury in 
contempt cases as they have supported the right of Negroes to equal protection and due 
process of law. The governor would also have had to appeal on the ground that his con-
tempt was criminal, not civil, and that therefore he was entitled to trial by jury. 
